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The Morning ToiletRobinson Memorial MaternityMassachusetts Homeopathic Hospital, undated ca 1900
Jennie M. Robinson Memorial Hospital was completed in1916 and was endowed by Wallace F. Robison incommemoration of his wife. The Robinson was the largestmaternity hospital in New England at the time, and theendowment was meant to make the institution self­supporting and able to provide services to those who wouldotherwise be unable to afford them. The original facility had70 beds, with two lower outpatient floors, three upperinpatient maternity department floors, and one privatepatient floor with 8 of 12 rooms equipped with individualbaths. Over the century of service, thousands of newbornsentered the world in this building, including Sylvia Plathwho was born there in 1932. In 1929 the MassachusettsHomeopathic Hospital became part of MassachusettsMemorial Hospitals and eventually merged into the BostonUniversity Medical Center, now part of Boston MedicalCenter.
Today, the two once proud entranceways to the Robinson aresealed shut and the patients’ rooms turned into offices andincorporated into the Boston University School of MedicineRobinson Building. Once bustling, the steel grey doors of theMaternity entrance now overlook the loading dock ramp.The waterstruck brick and limestone trimmings show the ageof this century­old building.
The undated photograph from the archives of the AlumniMedical Library of Boston University School of Medicineshow us an intimate portrait of daily life in the Robinson.The pristine uniform of the unknown nurse captured in amoment of serene focus as the bright eyes of the young infantstare out at us.
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Join the Aceso Staff
Interested in getting involved with Aceso? We areactively looking for new Editors and GraphicDesigners to join our staff. We are recruiting for thisupcoming semester so spread the word!
Editors take part in shaping the overall direction ofAceso and review the articles submitted by ourwriters. This position requires the staff member tohave excellent writing and strong spelling skills.
Design Editors and graphic designers create thecover, layout the format, and manage the artwork ofAceso. This position requires either some art ordesign experience.
If you are interested in applying for one of thesepositions, please email us at aceso@bu.edu and letus know what position you are applying for.
About Aceso
This journal is named for a Greek goddess Aceso,the daughter of Asclepius and sister of Panacea.Her name comes from the Greek word akéomai,which means "to heal." She represented the act ofthe healing process itself. Unlike the other gods,she personified medicine from the patient’s side, aprocess that involved both the ill and the physician. Rather than a magic cure, personified byPanacea, Aceso was more involved in overall care and the realization that healthcare and well­being took time and the effort of an active process.
Letter from the EditorThe Things We Take Away:
It is my pleasure to introduce the second edition ofAceso: Journal of the Boston University School of MedicineHistorical Society. I sincerely hope that you will enjoythis publication as much as the editors, writers, and Ihad in assembling this journal. I would like topersonally thank the Boston University School ofMedicine Alumni Association and Dr. Gennady Gelmanfor their generous financial support of this publication.
The art and practice of healing has always been one ofthe fundamental parts of our society. Each and all ofour cultures have struggled with disease and injury intheir own uniquely human way. From Ancient Rome tomodern Durban (Forming a Healthy Principate, pg 6;Dengue in Durban, pg 40) humanity has confrontedhealthcare. In a myriad of variations medicine and itsinfinite permutations has been practiced since thebeginning of our civilization, and will likely be practiceduntil its end. Though there have been unprecedentedadvances made in medicine in the last one hundredyears since this issue’s cover photo was taken, one thinghas always remained the same: Us. The tools, targets,and places may change, but the struggles we wrestlewith have been fought before, and will be fought again.
Medicine, like so much of the Boston Medical Centercampus (Beautiful BCH, pg 19) has changed over time.The hospital sometimes feels like a living thing itself, astrong powerful force of collective effort. On themedical floor there is a sound created by the ever­present activity that fills the air with a constant lowhum. It is a sound so pervasive that it is sometimes onlynoticed by its absence or by the initiate. The whisk ofgowns, low sighs of oxygen masks, whine of alarms,and the slow beat of the monitor. This noise transportsme like Proust’s tea­soaked Madeleine, “Whence did itcome? What did it mean? How could I seize andapprehend it?”
One of the main goals of Aceso and the BostonUniversity School of Medicine Historical Society is tofoster the appreciation of the humanities at aninstitution dedicated to the study of science. As aprofession we rush from one room to the next, from onecase to the next, from one person to the next. Thefrenetic pace of modern medical practice is astounding.In a place so dedicated to the now, it is worthwhile to bereminded to look up from the chart or computer screenand really see around us and take pause. With Aceso, itis our intent to awaken the reader to the commonground we all share – not just with each other, but withthose that have come before us and those that shall comeafter us.
To me this is never more evident than when we realizethat we always have more in common with each otherthan we have different. I see this truth reflectedthroughout history. Whether it is in the letters ofAbelard and Heloise or the letters from servicementhanking a hospital for pictures of their newbornchildren (Pictures of Babies, pg 26), there is a commonground we all share. Here in the practice of medicinewe have a rare chance to be a direct witness to thiscommon humanity on a daily basis. We are privilegedto have a front­row seat to a world that so few see. Asmedical providers are we more than just passive actorson this stage, technicians to provide a service and bedone? What do we or what should we take then fromthe practice? I challenge you to be more than atechnician of medicine, but to look up: “Whence did itcome? What did it mean? How could I seize andapprehend it?”
Michael H. Sherman
BUSM Class of 2015 4Aceso
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About the Art
Unless noted, pictures throughout
this issue are from the archives of the
Alumni Medical Library of Boston
University School of Medicine.
Special thanks to A'Llyn Ettien for
allowing us to access the archives.
Aceso Submissions
Are you interested in History and Medicine?
Aceso: Journal of the BUSM Historical Society is accepting submissions fornext year’s issue. We are looking for contributions in the fields of:
• Medicine in Antiquity • History of Medicine
• History of Public Health and related fields • Ethics/Editorials
• History of Medical Education • General Medical History
• History of BUSM • Book Reviews
• History of BMC and Boston City Hospital • Medical Education
• History of Medicine in Boston
• Biographical Essays
If you have an interest in these topics or a suggestion for another topicand would like to write an article please contact us at: aceso@bu.edu
BCH surgical
amphitheater ca 1902
Boston City HospitalBaseball Team, 1935
Forming a Healthy Principate:
Medicine and Public Healthduring Augustan Rule
David WellsBoston University School of MedicineMD Candidate, Class of 2016
Ancient World
he history of medicalpractice has been adynamic one,constantly changing toincorporate newdiscoveries. Many ofthe procedures ofantiquity can be deemed barbaric,even tortuous, in comparison totoday. Until the rather recentadvent of modern medicine, greatdiscoveries and advancement inmedicine and public health werefew and far between with notoriouscure­all elixirs, unsanitaryprocedures, and the infamous act ofblood­letting reigning for centuries.The unscientific nature of medicine
at these early times made it worthyof ill­repute and mistrust, whichcan be easily seen in the attitudes ofRoman society during the periodsof the patrician­ruled Republic (753­ 27 BCE) and the AugustanPrincipate (27 BCE – 14 CE). Duringthis time, medicine was anexclusively Greek province,meaning that a medicus, or doctor,was often a slave captured fromGreece; only rarely did a Romanundertake the profession. [1] As inthe case of many things that wereintroduced to Roman societythrough the process ofHellenization, such as theexpansion in wealth and luxury,
Greek medicine was met with muchdistrust by the more conservative.One such man, Cato the Elder, gaveGreek doctors the title of carnifex, aterm used to describe both butchersand executioners, due to thedubious nature of medicine at thetime. Cato felt so mistrustful ofphysicians that he even made apoint of forbidding his son fromseeing them. Ancient medicine wasan intricately interwoven fabric ofobservation and superstition, butwas a necessary step in the eventualdevelopment of the scientificprocess. Indeed at the very time,though an understanding ofpathogens and epidemiology had6Aceso
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not been developed, it was stillunderstood that healthy practiceswere necessary for a well­maintained urban infrastructure.The Augustan Principate, asa major transition from the Senate­dominated Republic to aconsolidated rule, was a periodinnovative in its blended emphasison old traditions and improvement.Due to this departure from thestatus quo, the approval of thepopulace was essential in order forAugustus to present himself as asavior of Rome rather than thedespotic ruler Julius Caesar hadbeen. In his emphasis on improvingthe Roman state through hisreligious piety, his efforts atimproving the infrastructure, andhis direct measures to encouragethe presence of doctors in Rome,Augustus made considerableprogress in increasing the healthand wellness of Roman citizens,whether intended or not. Augustus,in many ways, paved the way to theadvancement of medical scienceand public health, thoughmedicine’s religious ties were stillmuch intact.Aesculapius was one ofmany in the Roman pantheon to beconsidered a god of healing. Heacted as the patron saint of alldoctors, and was widely veneratedthroughout the ancient world withsites near most majorcities, notablyEpidaurus, Pergamum,and Rome. [2] Whilemany of the majordeities that Romeadopted during itsHellenization had theirmyths modified to beincorporated into theexisting Romantheology, Aesculapiusis unique amongstmany minor foreigndeities, having beendirectly invited into the Romanpantheon. This is also a history fardifferent from the numerous cultswhich were generally met withgreat suspicion by the Senate fortheir encouragement of non­Romanvalues, such as the Greek god ofwine and inebriation, Bacchus.Ovid, a poet during the Principate,describes this event in hisMetamorphoses. In the midst of a
great plague afflicting Rome around293 BCE, the Romans appealed toApollo who replied that theyshould seek out his son Aesculapiusat Epidaurus in Greece. [3] Uponarriving at Epidaurus, the Romansconvinced Aesculapius to desert thecity in order to return with them tocure Rome of its plague. [4] Assuch, the healing god transformedinto a great serpent andaccompanied the Romans back totheir great city, and upon reachingRome the great snake took refugeon Tiber Island. [5] Ovid concludeshis tale saying:
This is where the serpentine son of Phoebus/ Disembarked from the Latian ship, andresuming / His celestial form he came to theRomans / As the god who brings health, andended their sorrows. [6]
The legend surrounding thefoundation of the cult ofAesculapius in Rome is anintriguing one for several reasons.For a foreign god, Aesculapius waspopularly worshiped throughoutthe ancient world and a cult ofsome sort was found at nearlyevery major city and often manysmall ones. [7] Some have arguedthat the mistrust that his distinctlyinternational status garnered waspartly why his temple was locatedon Tiber Island, on the outskirts ofthe city ratherthan in Romeitself. [8] Othershave argued thatthis may in factindicate somebasic knowledgeof public healthsince in a vastmajority of cities,both Greek andRoman, templesto healing godswere often founda distance fromthe city, possibly recognizing thebenefits of keeping the infirmedseparate from the healthy populace.[9, 10] Furthermore, Aesculapius,even though he was a foreign deity,was portrayed as being invited intothe Roman pantheon rather thaninfiltrating it like those previouslymentioned. Regarding theacceptance of Aesculapius, VivianNutton, a scholar on ancient
medicine states, “Medicine wasGreek and it had been importedinto Rome only with the approvaland authority of the RomanSenate.” [11] Aesculapius, despitehis foreign association, became anaccepted symbolic and a literalhealer of Rome during its plaguedtimes. Though the adoption ofAesculapius certainly reflected aburgeoning public focus on publichealth, explicit Augustan policieswere perhaps better conveyedthrough direct imagery includingthe renewal of ancient traditionsand iconographies.Augustan cultural renewal,his program which includedreviving antiquated religiouscustoms and restoration of templesin Rome, helped to reveal hisassociations with the healingdeities. In his Res Gestae, anautobiographical record of hisachievements, Augustus bringsattention to this demonstration ofpiety, directly celebrating hisrestoration of eighty­two temples inRome. [12] While it is not clearwhether he included the temple ofAesculapius on the Tiber in thiscalculation, Augustus didcontribute to the god’s temple inEpidaurus, restoring manydecaying buildings and dedicatingnew temples to Aesculapius,Hygieia, and Apollo. [13]Additionally, after Augustus hadbeen healed by his personalphysician, Antonius Musa, a statueto the doctor was erected on TiberIsland next to the statue ofAesculapius, according to theancient historian Suetonius. [14]While Augustus’ associations withAesculapius and medicine ingeneral are clear, their overall effecton his public image or on the healthof Rome are more obscure.Nevertheless, Augustus employedmore tangible reforms to improvethe wellbeing of his Principate.Much of Rome’s success inthe ancient world can be attributedto its well­organized and well­maintained military. As such, thiswas one sphere that was notoverlooked during Augustanreform efforts since the health oflegionary soldiers was so vital tothe wellbeing of the empire. Indeed,Augustus’ measures wereconceived when the memory of the7Aceso
While many of themajor deities thatRome adopted duringits Hellenization hadtheir myths modifiedto be incorporated intothe existing Romantheology, Aesculapiusis unique amongstmany minor foreigndeities, having beendirectly invited intothe Roman pantheon.
vast numbers of Civil Warcasualties that had marked theending decades of the Republicwere still fresh in the minds ofmany Romans. It appears thatAugustus employed a number ofreforms to increase the overallhealth and fitness of his militaryincluding the avoidance ofunhealthy sites for camps, betterwaste disposal, and improvedlogistical provisions for legionsthroughout the empire. [15]Additionally, enlistment proceduresbecame much more selective, eveninvolving a medical examination.[16] Furthermore, Augustus createdthe first professional medical corpsand established the use ofvaletudinaria, or camp­hospitals, inthe field. [17] These changes couldhave improved the overall health ofa Roman legion, decreasing diseaseprevalence while also increasing theavailability of treatment for awounded soldier in the field.While Rome enjoyed thesuccesses of Augustan militaryconquests, measures were alsotaken to increase the wellbeing ofthe citizenry. During 23 BCE,Augustus suffered a serious illnesswhich Suetonius described as“abscesses on the liver [which]reduced him to such despair”. [18]While the exact pathology isunclear, his physician, AntoniusMusa, prescribed cold compressesafter which the princeps recovered.To show his gratitude for theintervention of his doctor, inaddition to the statue mentionedearlier, Augustus granted taximmunity to all medicalpractitioners, a practice repeated bylater emperors. [19] In addition tothe granting of this privilege,Augustus confirmed anothermeasure introduced by his adoptivefather, Julius Caesar, which grantedcitizenship to all foreign doctorswho were practicing in Rome,giving legal benefits to physicians.[20] These privileges bestowed onphysicians by Augustus wouldhave served to encourage health onthe medical front, though it was hisacts which directly affected publichealth that may have benefitedRome the most.Augustus himself alsohighlighted repeatedly one of hisown great acts benefiting the health
and happiness of Romans citizens:his control of the granary supply.Augustus found this action pivotalenough that he included it in his ResGestae. [21] Suetonius noted how,“In times of food shortage[Augustus] often supplied grain toevery man […] at a very cheap rate,or occasionally even free,” an actionthat he remarks was for theimprovement of public healthrather thanpopularity, thoughthese two ideasneed not bemutually exclusive.[22] Followinganother grainshortage in 9 CE,Augustus assignedthe management ofthe grain supply toa prefectus annonae,an equestrian directly responsible tothe emperor, to protect from futurefamine. [23] The guarantee of asteady food supply improved theoverall wellbeing of citizens whilealso being a very popular measureamongst Romans, much like theinterest Augustan reform placed inpublic infrastructure.Perhaps no other reformhas had such a lasting and dramaticimpact on Roman society as hispublic building projects. Directlyinstituted by Augustus, as well ashis close associates Maecenas andAgrippa, these building projects notonly improved the overallappearance of the city but also theinfrastructure and consequentlypublic health of such a large urbancenter. Though Maecenas, a closefriend and political advisor ofAugustus, is best known for hispatronage of many of thePrincipate’s greatest poetsincluding both Vergil and Horace,he was also pivotal in carrying outthe Augustan building program.[24] Specifically, Maecenas wasinvolved in the reform of Rome’sfunerary practices, partly through acivic beautification project. In hisfirst book of satire, Horacedescribes a large cemetery, locatednear the Esquiline gate, that actedas an open pit for mass burials withbones and rotting flesh litteredthroughout the ground. [25] Thiswould have been a horrific andacrid site of decay as well as a major
concern for public health and thespread of pathogens. Around 40BCE, however, Maecenas buriedthis field under thirty feet of soil,planting a hortus, or public garden,on top, a significant measureagainst such a nuisance. [26]Additionally, after the constructionof Maecenas’ gardens, there is littleevidence of any additional publicmass burials. John Bodel, a scholaron Roman burialpractices, suggeststhat this is anindication of a movetowards masscremation in publicustrinae, orcrematoria, as ameans to dispose ofthe numerouscorpses of the poor.[27] The movementaway from large burial pits wouldhave been greatly felt within thecity, not only through removingsuch maligned sites as Horacedescribes, but also the subsequentbetterment of public health. Thiswas only one step, however, in adramatic overhaul of publicinfrastructure carried out by theAugustan regime.Some of the most lastingimpacts of public works institutedduring the Principate can beattributed to Marcus Agrippa actingas aedile, a type of city magistrate,and his work in managing thesewage and water of Rome.Numerous sources attest to thegeneral disrepair of the publicinfrastructure in Rome, much of itdue to decades of neglect because ofcivil war. [28­30] Sewage removalwas one such system. The CloacaMaxima, built centuries earlierduring the early Republic, formed acomplex sewer system beneathRome, disposing waste from publiclatrines. Naturally, due to thepassage of time, the great sewer wasin much disrepair at the time of thePrincipate. In response, Agrippacleaned the accumulated debris andrestored the entire system. [31]Cassius Dio illustrated this pointwith the image of Agrippa riding aboat through the Cloaca Maxima towhere it emptied into the Tiber inorder to clear it. [32] Not onlywould his efforts have aided in thesheer stench created by the blocked8Aceso
Augustus confirmedanother measureintroduced by hisadoptive father, JuliusCaesar, which grantedcitizenship to all foreigndoctors who werepracticing in Rome,giving legal benefitsto physicians.
and overflowing sewage, but alsowould ensure a clear increase insanitation and disease preventionthrough restoring its proper flow.However, it would beAgrippa’s water plan that would beone of the greatest, long­lastingachievements of the AugustanPrincipate. Astonishingly, though ithad expanded greatly, Rome hadnot repaired the aqueductssupporting the city, or built a newline in one hundred years. [33] As aresult, Augustus appointed Agrippaas Rome’s first permanent watercommissioner, a position he used tomuch effect and which continuedafter his death. First, primarilythrough his own expense, Agripparepaired the Aqua Appia, the AquaAnio Vetus, and the Aqua Marcia,even expanding the latter, anachievement noted by Augustus inhis Res Gestae. [34, 35] Additionally,Agrippa constructed three separatelines, an impressive andunprecedented achievement in suchshort a period of time. One of theselines was the Aqua Tepula whichwas drastically reworked toimprove both its total capacity aswell as its drinkability, while twoother lines, the Aqua Julia and theAqua Virgo, were completely newintroductions, greatly expandingthe total water available to thecitizenry and Augustan buildingprogram. [35, 36] The utility of theseadditions can be seen in the AquaVirgo which is still in use today, itsterminating point marked by theTrevi Fountain. [37] Altogether,Agrippa’s water plan doubled thetotal supply of water brought intothe city and marked a significantdeparture from traditional waterinfrastructure by being much morespecialized, and therefore moreefficient. [38] The end result of thisvast expansion was not only greateraccess to water, but also ensured thebeautification and sanitation of theentire city through the Augustanbuilding project.Augustus, in his program torestore and aggrandize Rome, leftpotent changes, some of whichlasted well beyond him and eveninfluence us today. While medicineand the natural sciences may nothave been his central focus, thesedisciplines were met with his
support through related measures.Additionally, while Augustusstrove to be identified with orderand tradition, his connection withpublic health and medicine wouldnot have escaped everyone. Indeedit seems that Augustus did much toimprove the public health inmultiple sectors, including both themilitary and Rome’s civilianpopulation. He played a very activerole both directly and through hiscolleagues, Maecenas and Agrippa,in restoring and greatly improvingthe public infrastructure. This hadsuch a great effect that Rome reliedon these improvement forgenerations to come and can evenbe found functioning today. Mostimportant, however, is that thesemeasures and emphases takentogether would have providedRome with improved public healthduring Augustan rule that wouldinfluence the millennia of scientificand medical progress that haveshaped the modern world.
Notes:
[1] Scarborough J. Roman Medicine.Aspects of Greek and Roman Life.Scullard HH, ed. Ithaca: CornellUniversity Press; 1969: 113.[2] Compton MT. The Union ofReligion and Health in AncientAsklepieia. Journal of Religion andHealth. 1998; 37: 303.[3] Nutton V. Ancient Medicine.Taub L, ed. New York: Routledge;2004: 159.[4] Ovid. Aesculapius.Metamorphoses. Lombardo S, Trans.Indianapolis: Hackett PublishingCompany, Inc.; 2010: 15.725.[5] Ibid, 15.822.[6] Ibid, 15.824­827.[7] Nutton, 106­7.[8] Scarborough, 25.[9] Compton, 303.[10] Nutton, 107.[11] Ibid, 161.[12] Augustus. Res Gestae DiviAugusti. Cooley AE, Trans. NewYork: Cambridge University Press;2009: 20.[13] Jackson R. Doctors and Diseasesin the Roman Empire. Norman:
University of Oklahoma Press; 1988:149.[14] Suetonius. “Divus Augustus.”The Twelve Caesars. Trans. Graves,Robert. New York: Penguin Group,2007: 59.[15] Jackson, 129.[16] Ibid, 130.[17] Scarborough, 71.[18] Suetonius, 81.[19] Elliott JS. In the Reign of theCaesars to the Death of Nero.Outlines of Greek and RomanMedicine. Boston: Milford House,Inc.; 1971: 65.[20] Nutton, 249.[21] Augustus, 5.[22] Suetonius, 41­42.[23] Rowell HT. The City. Rome inthe Augustan Age. Norman:University of Oklahoma Press; 1962:151.[24] Osgood J. Sense of Promise.Caesar's Legacy: Civil War and theEmergence of the Roman Empire. NewYork: Cambridge University Press;2006: 346.[25] Horace. Satires 1.8. Svarlien J,Trans. Diotima Anthology. 2003.<http://www.stoa.org/diotima/anthology/horsat1.8.shtml>. AccessedMay 8, 2012.[26] Bodel, John. Dealing with theDead: Undertakers, Executionersand Potter's Fields in Ancient Rome.Death and Disease in the AncientCity. Hope VM and Eireann M, eds.New York: Routledge; 2000: 132.[27] Ibid, 130.[28] Evans HB. Agrippa's WaterPlan. American Journal ofArchaeology. 1982: 403.[29] Osgood, 331.[30] Zanker P. The Power of Images inthe Age of Augustus. Shapiro A,Trans. Ann Arbor: University ofMichigan Press; 1988: 71.[31] Rowell, 126.[32] Cassius Dio. Historia Romana.Foster HB, Trans. 2003.<http://www.gutenberg.org/catalog/world/readfile?fk_files=1476164&pageno=1>. Accessed May 8,2012.[33] Osgood, 331.[34] Augustus, 80.[35] Evans, 401.[36] Osgood, 331.[37] Rowell, 126.[38] Evans, 411.
9Aceso
On the Origin of the BU Department ofOrthopaedic Surgery:Orthopaedic Residency Program #66
Robert E. Leach, MDBoston University School of Medicine
G. Richard Paul, MDBoston University School of Medicine
On Campus
n the spring of 1999,
Dr. Thomas Einhorn
Professor and Chairman
of the Department of
Orthopaedic Surgery at Boston
University School of Medicine and
the Director of Orthopaedic
Residency Program #66 asked me
[Robert Leach] to present a history
of the program, during the Alumni
Day Symposium held at Boston
Medical Center. This written history
is an outgrowth of that talk. I have
tried to contact many former
residents and staff men from the
earliest years in hopes of obtaining
as precise a history as possible. As
would be expected, many of the
people previously associated with
the program have passed on, and
others were not able to remember
events of much consequence. As a
result much of this history comes
from my own remembrances and
personal experience, which started
in August 1964. I did find some
memos and letters concerning the
I
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Dr. Robert Leach founded the Department of Academic Orthopaedic Surgery at Boston University MedicalCenter in 1970 and served as Chairman until 1994. From 1989, he was also Editor in Chief of TheAmerican Journal of Sports Medicine, a position he held until 2002. During those years and until 2009he continued to teach residents and medical students regularly at Boston University. He now teaches at agreatly reduced level. In retirement, he and his wife of 58 years, Laurie, travel a great deal. Bob continues toplay tennis and pursue his avocation of rock climbing at Joshua Tree and Acadia National Parks. A largefamily of children and grandchildren provide many visiting opportunities. He believes he was lucky topractice orthopedics during the 1960s through the 1990s.
Dr. G. Richard Paul, MD is Emeritus Associate Professor of Orthopaedic Surgery at Boston University. Heis a member of the American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, American Orthopaedic Society of SportsMedicine, and the New England Orthopaedic Society. He served as Team Surgeon for the NortheasternDepartment of Athletics for 35 years and he served as Team Surgeon for the United States Football League’sBoston Breakers. Dr. Paul also served as President of the Medical­Dental Staff and Hospital Trustee in1982­1983.
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early years and did talk at length
with some of the earliest residents.
Help came from other sources
particularly Dr. G. Richard Paul
who has been associated with the
program since 1967 and Dr. Willard
Dotter, a long­term member of the
Lahey Clinic dating back to the mid
1950s. Since no
previous history
has been recorded
a few of these
dates, names, and
occurrences are
surmises based
upon the best
available information.
One year after the
formation of the American Board of
Orthopaedic Surgery in 1934, the
Boston City Hospital, under the
orthopaedic leadership of Dr. Otto J.
Herman, applied for and received
approval for one resident education
position in orthopaedic surgery,
which would last for one year. In
the same year, the Shriners Hospital
for Crippled Children in
Springfield, MA, under the
leadership of Dr. R. N. Hatt was
approved for one resident for one
year. These two events were the
genesis of what was to become
Program #66. It was not until 1940
that the Lahey Clinic, whose
orthopaedic chairman was Dr. G. N.
Haggert, applied for a fellowship in
orthopaedics, and they were
granted one fellowship position
lasting for a period of one to three
years.
During the 1940s, the
orthopaedic services at Boston City
Hospital (BCH) and the Shriners
Hospital were independent
programs. Each hospital offered
training in orthopaedics, but there
was no integrated organized
program of orthopaedic education.
Residents worked very hard in the
1940s taking calls virtually every
night, for which they were paid the
munificent sum of $66.00 per
month. However, there were many
candidates for these positions. This
situation stayed the same until 1947,
when the Boston City Hospital
suddenly had two residents and the
Lahey Clinic had
four residents or
fellows who served
one to two years.
Fellows could stay
one year while
residents had to stay
two. At the same
time, Dr. Gary Hough, Sr., who had
become Chief at the Shriners
Hospital started taking two
residents for one or two years. In
1948, Dr. Joseph Shortell, for whom
the present Boston City Shortell
Unit is named, became the
Chairman of the Fracture and
Orthopaedic Service at Boston City
Hospital. Throughout the 1940s,
these services at Boston City, the
Shriners, and at Lahey were
independent entities, each offering
training in a particular orthopaedic
discipline, but there was no
organized program.
Gestation took a while, but
it appears that Program #66 (as
designated by the American Board
of Orthopaedics Surgery) was
officially born in 1950 when the
Lahey Clinic and BCH joined their
orthopaedic programs under the
dual leadership of Dr. R. Sullivan,
who had replaced Dr. Shortell, at
BCH and Dr. G. Edmund Haggert
at Lahey. Dr. Shortell, a much
respected and revered surgeon, had
died an early death. The
orthopaedic residents from BCH
and Lahey then obtained their
children’s training in orthopaedics
at Shriners Hospital in Springfield
and at the Massachusetts Hospital
School in Canton, where Dr. Paul
Norton, the inventor of the Norton
Brace for scoliosis, was the chief.
Dr. Norton also became one of the
four chiefs who met to select the
residents. Program #66 was
formally approved by the American
Board of Orthopaedic Surgery
(ABOS) in 1950, and the residency
was first listed in the AMA
Directory in 1951. By 1952, the four
institutions were full partners in the
orthopaedic education of residents,
and for reasons not immediately
apparent, the administrative head
came from Lahey. It may have been
because Dr. Haggert was a
nationally known figure. Thus,
Program #66 was called the Lahey
Clinic Integrated Orthopaedic
Program and Dr. Haggert was the
first Program Chief. The residents
could obtain children’s training at
Shriners in Springfield or at the
Massachusetts Hospital School in
Canton. The children’s training
initially had residents going to both
institutions. Later residents went to
one or the other of those hospitals.
There was a marked difference in
the training at the two institutions
with The Massachusetts Hospital
School having a clientele that was
largely composed of patients with
severe chronic disabling diseases.
During the early 1950s,
resident training programs in
orthopaedics as dictated by the
ABOS, included one or two years of
general surgery, which could be
taken at any accredited institution
plus three years of orthopaedics,
divided in this case between Lahey
with one year of adult, Shriners or
the Mass Hospital School for one
year of pediatrics, and BCH for one
year of trauma. There was also a
pediatric rotation at the Lakeville
Hospital where chronic conditions
in children were treated. Whether a
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resident went for his training to
Shriners, Lakeville, or Canton (Mass
Hospital School) was rather due to
the “luck of the draw," and this
created some discord amongst
residents, some of whom preferred
the Shriners training while other
preferred to stay nearer Boston.
When Program #66 was first
organized, the general surgical
service at BCH was in charge of
fracture treatment. In 1952, Dr.
Sullivan, who must have been
dealing from a position of strength
in the hospital, assumed control of
the fracture service for the
orthopaedic department. This was a
most important event in the history
of Program #66 and in Boston.
Fracture care has always been one
of the building blocks in
orthopaedic education and is
essential to an accredited training
program in orthopaedics, but
general surgery had also considered
it their area of expertise.
As stated previously Dr.
Haggert was the first Program
Chief. Dr. George Hammond joined
the Lahey Clinic in 1953 and was
named chairman of the Orthopaedic
Department at Lahey in 1957. Dr.
Hammond had trained at the
University of Michigan and first
went to the Sayre Clinic in
Pennsylvania. He brought special
knowledge of the back and
shoulder, and he was ably assisted
by Dr. Willard Dotter, who had
accompanied him from the Sayre
Clinic in PA. Dr. Dotter practiced at
the Lahey Clinic and was a valued
teacher in the program for 32 years
from 1955 to 1987.
It was in 1956 that the name
of Dr. Alexander Aitken appears as
Chairman of Orthopaedics at
Boston City. Dr. Aitken was also a
nationally recognized orthopaedic
surgeon who created the
classification of epiphyseal growth
injuries, which later gave birth to
the Salter classification. In talks
with some older members of the
Lahey staff, they stated that the
program started with Dr. Aitken as
the principal organizer, but this
appears incorrect. From documents
that I have personally seen, ABOS
approval was obtained for Program
#66 in 1950, and the Residency was
officially listed in the AMA
Directory in 1951.
Towards the late 1950s, Dr.
Richard Kilfoyle became very
involved in residency training in
Boston, when he went to the Carney
Hospital. Dr. Kilfoyle ran the
Carney and the two children’s
hospitals, the Mass Hospital School
and Lakeville Hospital, although
Dr. Norton remained the titular
chief at the latter two hospitals. Dr.
Kilfoyle later went on to establish a
separate, independent program
based at the Carney Hospital using
the Mass Hospital School and
Lakeville for his pediatric rotations
and both the New England Medical
Center and Boston City Hospital for
additional trauma
and adult. This
Carney program
eventually merged
into the Tufts
University program
in 1990 when
virtually all programs
were required to have a university
base.
While the situation at
Lahey was stable it was not so at
BCH. Dr. Aitken, who had come to
Boston City Hospital in his later
years, left that position in 1963.
There were then a series of interim
chiefs at City Hospital for several
years, including Dr. Arthur
Thibodeau of Tufts University, Dr.
Robert Uehlein of Beth Israel
Hospital, and Dr. Paul O’Brien of
Carney Hospital.
While cooperation should
have been essential to the success of
the young program, integration was
lax and communication between the
hospital chiefs was minimal in
Program #66 during the 1950s and
'60s. There was virtually no
crossover of personnel or teaching,
and the only meetings they had in
common were those in which the
chiefs met to choose residents.
Boston City had Saturday morning
Grand Rounds to which all
orthopaedic surgeons were invited,
but the only person not usually at
Boston City, who attended these,
was Dr. Leach of the Lahey staff.
During the mid­'60s it was obvious
that the program at Boston City was
not doing well, because of the lack
of a full­time leader. In 1967, Dr.
Charles Woodhouse became the
Chief at Boston City Hospital, and
what followed the next year and a
half could only be described as
tumultuous. Because of recurring
problems, he was asked to resign
and was replaced for a period of
time by Dr. Paul
O’Brien, whose
primary affiliation
was at Carney. But,
Dr. O’Brien always
had a strong affinity
towards Boston City
Hospital and did his
best to maintain the service.
In Springfield in 1963, Dr.
James Fisher became Chief at the
Shriners Hospital succeeding Dr.
Gary Hough, Sr. The Lahey Clinic
staff was augmented by the
addition of Dr. William Torgerson
in 1963 and in late 1964 by Dr.
Robert Leach, who came directly
out of the Navy to join the Clinic. In
1967, Dr. Hammond retired as
Chairman but stayed on to teach
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and practice. Dr. Leach, who
trained at the University of
Minnesota before going into the
Navy, was appointed Chairman at
Lahey. In the years 1956­1970 the
resident rotations remained
essentially the same, except that in
the mid­1960s the rotations at the
Mass Hospital School and Lakeville
were dropped, and all residents
went to the Shriners for their
children’s training.
During 1967 Dr. David
Segal and Dr. G. Richard Paul of
whom more will be written later,
became fellow residents, and they
have continued an association with
Program #66 which has lasted into
the new millennium. During the 60s
the Lahey Clinic was known for its
reconstructive surgery with some
emphasis on the conditions of the
spine and shoulder, with Dr.
Hammond being well regarded as
an authority on conditions of the
shoulder. Dr. Dotter was
developing a foot and ankle
practice. During 1966­67, sports
medicine became an aspect of the
program when Dr. Leach became
the orthopaedic consultant for the
Boston Red Sox and team doctor for
the professional soccer team, the
Boston Beacons.
In November 1969, a
significant meeting occurred when
Dr. Albert Ferguson, Jr., the
President of the American Board of
Orthopaedic Surgery, made a two
day inspection visit to Program #66.
Of interest, his father, Albert
Ferguson, Sr., had served as an
associate Professor of Fracture and
Orthopaedic Surgery at Boston City
Hospital during the 1930s. The
present Dr. Ferguson, Jr. went on to
become the Chairman and Professor
of the University of Pittsburgh
Orthopaedic Program. At the
conclusion of his visit to Program
#66, he informed Dr. Leach that the
program could not remain free
standing without a university
affiliation. He said that the Board
would not allow this in the future.
He proposed to Dr. Leach that he
either go to Tufts University or to
Boston University and that the
program under his present aegis
would be transferred to that
institution with Dr. Leach as the
Chairman. Dr. Leach’s classic
response to this was, “Can you do
that?”
Following some
negotiations on July 1, 1970, Dr.
Leach left the Lahey Clinic and
became the Professor of
Orthopaedic Surgery at Boston
University School of Medicine and
co­director of the Fracture Service at
Boston City Hospital with Dr.
Henry Banks, who had become the
new Chief at Tufts University. Dr.
William Torgerson succeeded Dr.
Leach as the Chief at the Lahey
Clinc. Boston University previously
had no academic or residency
orthopaedic program. They did
have several
practioners who
used the hospital
and who ran one
clinic, which was
the extent of the
medical school
teaching at the
time. The acting
head, Dr. Joseph
Kopell was a busy
surgeon who did
most of his work
at Beth Israel Hospital. Dr. H.
Sakellarides, who did primarily
hand surgery, had a busy practice
and remained for many years. In
early July 1970, Dr. Charles Gregory
of the ABOS visited UH and BCH
and gave approval for the new
Program #66 based at Boston
University School of Medicine. A
review of past history reveals that
during the 1930s and '40s, Dr. Lot
Howard had been the Head of
Orthopaedics at Boston University,
but somehow the department had
disappeared. However, there had
never been a training program of
any sort.
Following Dr. Woodhouse’s
unlamented departure from Boston
City and Dr. O’Brien’s efforts at
holding the program together a
triumvirate arrived, Dr. Henry
Banks of Tufts University; Dr. Leach
of Boston University; and Dr. Bart
Quigley from the Harvard Surgical
Service. Dr. Quigley was a General
Surgeon with an interest in
fractures and sports injuries. These
co–directors rebuilt that service into
a sound academic program.
Residents from BU, Tufts, and the
Carney Hospital all rotated through
the Boston City Hospital.
Shortly after his
appointment as Chairman at Boston
University and co­director at Boston
City, Dr. Leach was awarded the
AOA American,
British, Canadian
Traveling Fellowship
and in the spring left
for six weeks. This
was possible because
Dr. Isadore Yablon
from Montreal,
Canada, joined the BU
faculty. The fellowship
eventually proved to
be of great value to the
program because Dr.
Leach was in direct contact with
some of his USA peers who would
become the future leaders of
American Orthopaedics, and it also
provided knowledge of and
contacts from the British Isles.
Dr. Yablon, who was taking
over the reins short term, had a
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primary interest in trauma,
particularly ankle fractures and in
basic research concerning articular
cartilage degeneration. Also Dr. G
Richard Paul having finished his
residency became a full time staff
member working at BCH and
University Hospital plus working
with the Massachusetts Crippled
Children’s Program with Dr. Arthur
Pappas of Children’s Hospital. Dr.
Pappas soon left there to become
the Chairman of Orthopaedics at
the new University of
Massachusetts Medical School in
Worcester. Jewish Memorial
Hospital became one of the BU
non­resident affiliates, with Dr.
Yablon becoming chief there. Sports
Medicine and a captive patient
population was further enhanced
by the addition of Northeastern
University athletic teams plus the
teams at Bentley College and later
on the Boston University athletic
teams. Further building Sports
Medicine occurred when Dr. Leach
became the Boston Celtics
orthopaedic consultant in 1968, a
position which he took with him to
BU.
During the years 1971­1974,
Program #66 remained stable.
Closer ties were developed between
UH, BCH, and Carney Hospital
whose orthopaedic service was
directed by Dr. Richard Kilfoyle.
Carney residents rotated at both
UH and BCH. During this period
the orthopedic residency training
consisted of a one year internship,
one year of general surgery training
and three years of orthopaedic
surgery training. The initial two
years could be spent at any
approved hospital of the resident’s
choice.
In 1974, the city of Boston
decreed that for administrative and
financial reasons only one medical
school would be affiliated with
Boston City Hospital. The three
schools in place were asked to
submit proposals. Harvard Medical
School sent a letter basically stating
that “they were Harvard,” and
therefore they should be chosen.
Tufts University suggested that the
three school system was working
well and should be left in place.
Boston University’s Dean, Dr.
Ephraim Friedman, presented a
detailed proposal as to why BU
should be the medical school of
choice for Boston City Hospital.
Boston University was selected to
direct Boston City Hospital. Doctors
Banks and Quigley had to leave the
orthopaedic service in the hands of
Boston University. Dr. Banks had
done a superb job of directing the
service, and before he left he
cautioned Dr. Leach that Boston
University would have to find
another trauma service because he
believed that Boston City was in
such bad financial shape that it
would soon close. However, Boston
mayor, Kevin White, decided that
BCH would not close during his
tenure, and BCH started a gradual
building program of tearing down
old buildings and replacing them
with new ones, which has
continued into the 21st century. The
two years, 1974–1976, were very
tough in terms of the new program
because the staff at UH and BCH
was seriously depleted.
In 1974, with much urging
from Dr. Yablon, the orthopaedic
department offices were moved
from the old Preston Building ­ a
former Holiday Inn for Extended
Care – to the ground floor of
University Hospital in space
previously occupied by the
Emergency Room. The space
included academic offices,
secretarial space, and a small
conference room. Dr. Yablon also
saw his patients there, although
other staff members continued to
see patients in the Doctor’s Office
Building. At the same time the
department had become so busy
surgically that it was allocated an
inpatient orthopaedic floor and two
full time physical therapists who
worked exclusively with
orthopaedic patients on that floor.
In 1974, Dr. Leon Kruger
succeeded Dr. Fisher as Chief of
Staff at the Shriners Hospital when
Dr. Fisher suffered a stroke, which
required him to retire. Concurrently
and as the result of interesting
discussions and hard core
negotiations between Dr. Leach and
Dr. Kruger, Boston University
orthopaedic residents were sent to
Bay State Medical Center in
Springfield for a six month rotation
in adult and trauma. There were
major misgivings on the part of
some of the BU staff, which did not
believe that the Bay State Medical
Center rotation was a good idea.
However, with the association
between Dr. Kruger at Shriners and
at Bay State, an accommodation was
reached. Interestingly, over the
years, Baystate proved to be a
fruitful addition to the program.
The residents accumulated a great
deal of surgical experience with
such men as Howard Crawford and
John De Weese and were exposed to
different thoughts and surgical
procedures. During this time the
Lahey rotation remained essentially
the same, with an emphasis on
reconstructive surgery.
In 1976, the program
needed new energetic, attending
surgeons and help at Boston City.
The timing was perfect for a
Program #66 graduate, Dr. David
Segal, to return to Boston. Dr. Segal
had been working in Israel after
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finishing his residency and was
looking for a temporary position in
the United States. Advancement in
the Israeli Academic system was
notoriously slow and the belief was
that he could better his academic
resume here for a few years before
returning. He was appointed Chief
of the Department at BCH where he
was a superb leader and teacher.
This temporary
position lasted nine
years. The distinctive
leadership styles of
Dr. Leach and Dr.
Segal formed an
interesting contrast. It
was rumored that Dr.
Segal had graduated
from the “Genghis
Khan School of
Diplomacy” and Dr.
Leach was more from the British
Polite School of Diplomacy. The
arrangement was largely successful
in terms of things accomplished for
Program #66.
The 1970s witnessed – for
Boston ­ unusual institutional
cooperation between the three
Boston Orthopaedic Programs, plus
a steady positive development of
Program #66. There was a close
working relationship with regard to
residency training with Dr. Henry
Banks at Tufts and Dr. Henry
Mankin at Massachusetts General
Hospital. Boston University
Orthopaedics participated in an
Orthopaedic Pathology Course and
a Prosthetics Course in Boston each
year. Dr. Kruger ran the latter
course, which was well regarded.
For BU, clinical affiliations
were developed at outpatient clinics
in the Neighborhood Health
Centers in East Boston and
Roxbury. Dr. George Whitelaw, a
former resident, was helpful in
organizing and attending to these.
The orthopaedic department
provided medical care for many
athletic teams including Boston
University, Northeastern
University, Bentley College, and
eventually through the efforts of Dr.
Anthony Schepsis, a new addition
to the UH staff, the University of
Massachusetts Boston, plus the
Boston Celtics, two professional
soccer teams, the
Minutemen and
Tea Men, and the
professional tennis
team the Boston
Lobsters. Drs. Paul,
Leach and Schepsis
served as team
physicians for the
Boston Breakers of
the short lived US
Football League.
The US Tennis Championship
Tournament held yearly at the
Longwood Cricket Club gave
younger staff and residents
exposure to sports in a pleasant
setting. Other sports medicine
additions, which had started in the
early 1970s and continued on this
way for approximately 29 years
included rotations for medical
students and residents at Mt. Snow
and Stratton Mountain ski resorts in
Vermont. This also afforded the
staff and residents to enjoy working
vacations. Dr. Segal organized and
directed the orthopaedic outpatient
clinics at Boston City and also took
over the medical care and
retirement examinations for the
Boston Police and Boston Fire
departments.
The growth of the
Orthopaedic Training Program at
Boston University and Boston City
Hospital in the '70s attracted
outstanding orthopaedic residents;
amongst whom were Dr. George
Whitelaw, Dr. Anthony Schepsis,
Dr. Michael Corbett and Dr.
William Creevy all of whom trained
in Program #66 and went on to
serve as attending physicians for
many years. Dr. Schepsis continued
to serve as the Director of Sports
Medicine into the 21st century with
Dr. Creevy at BCH. Dr. Stephen
Wasilewski and Dr. Bernard Pfiefer
also graduated from the program in
the '70s and later joined the
department at the Lahey Clinic
where they contributed significantly
as attending physicians. Dr. Paul
continued to work at both hospitals
and eventually took over the
athlete’s care at Northeastern
University.
There was a small basic
science research program at BU
directed by Dr. Yablon in the 1970s
with his primary interest being in
the field of joint transplantation and
the effect of the synovium on
cartilage deterioration. He received
small amounts of funding from the
NIH but due to lack of funds and to
some extent time, the research never
really prospered despite Dr.
Yablon’s earnest efforts.
In the late 1970s, the ABOS
changed its requirements for
orthopaedic residents to one year of
general surgery and four of
orthopaedics. The BU resident
rotations were 12 months at
University Hospital, 12 months at
BCH, nine months at Shriners, nine
months at Lahey, and six months at
Bay State Medical Center. These
clinical rotations remained constant
until approximately 1995, when the
four years of orthopaedics changed
to 24 months at The Boston Medical
Center, which was comprised of
BCH and UH, and 12 months at
Lahey, six months at Shriners, and
six months at the Boston Veterans
Administration Hospital. The latter
was mandated by the BU Dean,
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which required dropping the Bay
State Medical Center from the
resident rotations. The VA had
become a larger cog in the medical
student teaching curriculum, which
to some extent forced the Dean’s
hand.
In the early 1980s, the BU
Orthopaedic department offices
were relocated from the UH first
floor to the Doctor’s Office Building
(DOB) on the 8th floor. This was
both for the academic offices and
where all patients were seen.
Shortly after that due mainly to Dr.
Yablon’s efforts a radiology unit
was added to the orthopaedic
department, which improved
patient care and service. This
lessened the time waiting for
doctors and patients and provided
some financial reimbursement.
During this period the Lahey Clinic
had moved from the Kenmore
Square area in Boston to Burlington,
Massachusetts, where it combined
its outpatient services and its own
hospital into one campus. They
added sports medicine and trauma
to its previously highly regarded
expertise in reconstructive surgery.
By the 1980s the Sports
Medicine section of Program #66
was doing very well. Dr. Anthony
Schepsis had joined the full time
orthopaedic staff, and he provided
another person interested in sports
medicine by assuming a major role
at the Boston University Athletic
Department. Later on in 1991, Dr.
Schepsis was joined by Dr. Timothy
Foster, who had his initial contact
with the orthopaedic department as
a football player at Boston
University. He graduated from BU
Medical School and from the BU
resident training program before
joining the full time staff. Much
later in 2006, these efforts would be
rewarded by a sports medicine
complex on the Boston University
undergraduate campus. Dr.
William Creevy joined the
department around this time and
provided both clinical expertise and
administrative skills. He went on to
earn a Master of Science in Health
Care Management, which continues
to benefit both the Orthopaedic
Department and Boston Medical
Center.
During the 1980s, the Lahey
Clinic continued to be not only an
integral part but a major partner in
Program #66. The clinic had moved
to Burlington where Dr. Wasilewski
joined the staff and Dr. Pfiefer
joined the clinic in 1984 after his
military service and developed an
orthopaedic spinal surgery section.
1984 found Dr. Torgerson retiring at
Lahey, and Dr. Wasilewski was
named as Chairman. He recruited
Dr. William Healy from Johns
Hopkins in 1985, who arrived with
special expertise in several areas but
particularly in joint replacement.
The residents at Lahey now gained
experience with joint replacement,
sports medicine, hand surgery, foot
and ankle surgery, and
some fracture
management during
the 1980s and 1990s.
From 1986,
and lasting a decade,
the only constant for
Program #66 seemed to be change.
In 1986 Dr. Segal left BCH to return
to Israel, where he received a
significant Orthopaedic
Chairmanship. He was replaced at
BCH as Director of Orthopaedic
Surgery by Dr. George Whitelaw.
Dr. G. Richard Paul continued to
benefit the program particularly the
resident teaching, with his large
patient population, which gave
residents a chance to watch and
practice good orthopaedic surgical
technique. During these years Dr.
Leach, while clinically very active at
UH was busy away from Boston
being named as Head Physician for
The USA Olympic team from 1980
through 1984 and to the US
Olympic Committee as Chairman of
Sports Medicine and Sports Science,
1985­1993. He was appointed to the
ABOS in 1984 for 10 years, during
which time he was the Treasurer
and on the Executive Committee.
In 1989, Dr. Leon Kruger
retired as Chief Surgeon at the
Shriners Hospital, and he was
replaced by Dr. John Roberts,
formerly Professor and Chairman at
Brown University and before that
Chairman of the Department at
New Orleans Children’s Hospital.
The Shriners Hospital was being
completely rebuilt and a marvelous
new structure was erected. When
Dr. Roberts retired from Shriners in
1997, he was replaced by Dr. David
Drvaric who had been the second in
command for many years and has
provided ongoing outstanding
leadership.
During this time there was
a great deal of building at
the Boston University
Medical Campus
including a completely
new hospital called the
Atrium Building at
University Hospital and a
new inpatient facility at Boston City
Hospital. In 1990, Dr. Wasilewski
left the Lahey Clinic for private
practice in Sun Valley, Idaho, and
Dr. William Healy was appointed
Chairman of the department at the
Lahey Clinic; Dr. Healy brought
about substantial revitalization of
the Lahey Orthopaedic Department.
During his tenure the Lahey
Department grew to become a large
multi­specialty group with sub­
specialty expertise in all areas. This
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has enhanced the clinical teaching
of Program #66. By 1999, Lahey had
subspecialty groups in joint
replacement (Drs. Healy, Iorio),
hand surgery (Drs. Margles,
Gumley, Kasparyan), spinal surgery
(Dr. Pfiefer), sports medicine (Drs.
Wilk, Lemos, Smiley), orthopaedic
trauma (Dr. Dube), and foot and
ankle surgery.
The Lahey research work
focused on techniques of total joint
arthroplasty, treatment of difficult
fractures, outcomes studies, and
evaluation of hospital costs in
orthopaedics. Shortly after
becoming Chairman at Lahey, Dr.
Healy was selected as one of the
first Japanese Orthopaedic
Association Traveling fellows by
the American Academy of
Orthopaedic Surgeons. (The
coordination and selection of JOA
fellows was moved from the AAOS
to the AOA in 1999.) This was an
important honor for the Lahey
Department and for Program #66.
Subsequently in 1998, another
Lahey physician, Dr. Iorio, received
the JOA Traveling Fellowship.
In November 1992, Dr.
Leach told Dean Aram Chobanian
that he wished to resign as
Chairman. The Dean, however,
asked him to stay on while a search
for his successor was begun. An
outside search did not find a
suitable candidate, and in 1994 Dr.
Isadore Yablon was named as
Interim Chief of the Orthopaedic
Department at BU. He continued in
this position until May 1997. In the
mid­1990s, University Hospital and
Boston City Hospital merged to
form The Boston Medical Center,
which was the first merger of a
private and municipal medical
facility in this area. The
arrangement worked far better than
many people had predicted and
continued to be successful until the
financial woes of Medicaid and
Medicare persisted after the 2008
debacle. Dr. William Creevy,
having received his Master of
Science in Health Care
Management, became the Chief at
BCH in 1996 and acted as Vice
Chairman for Clinical Affairs for
the department. New offices were
acquired at the BCH complex
completing the move from the
basement of the Shortell unit where
Dr. Banks, Quigley, and Leach had
originally worked to Dr. Segal’s 5th
floor offices in the Ambulatory Care
Center to the present space on the
second floor of the Dowling
Building at Boston City Hospital.
In the mid 1990s, the
Veterans Administration Hospital
in Jamaica Plain was put under the
aegis of the Boston University
Medical Center, and it was
determined that the orthopaedic
service would come under the
direct supervision of the Boston
University department. This
program had previously been
under the direction of Tufts, and
this change of directorship had
been delayed for several years but
was eventually implemented by the
new orthopaedic chairman at
Boston Medical Center. The
affiliation with the Veterans
Hospital necessitated the
termination of the relationship with
Bay State Medical center in
Springfield, which had worked well
for 20 years. During this period,
graduates of Program #66, Dr. G.
Richard Paul, Dr. Anthony
Schepsis, Dr. William Creevy, and
Dr. Timothy Foster continued
working and providing leadership
for the resident teaching.
The most significant
development in Program #66 since
the reorganization in July 1970 was
the appointment of a new Professor
and Chairman of the Department of
Orthopaedic Surgery at Boston
University School of Medicine in
May 1997. Dr. Thomas Einhorn
came to BU from the Mount Sinai
School of Medicine in New York
City and along with his clinical
skills, brought with him a strong
background in both administration
and basic scientific research. Within
the first calendar year the
department had many positive
changes including a departmental
practice plan, a well funded basic
research program, and greatly
expanded and modernized offices
on the 8th floor of the DOB. Of
interest, Dr. Einhorn was a former
American, British, Canadian
Traveling Fellow, which meant that
both permanent Chairmen of the
Department had won this honor.
When he came to Boston University,
Dr. Einhorn was an Associate Editor
of the Journal of Bone and Joint
Surgery, and he was later elected
President of the Orthopaedic
Research Society. In the years since
his appointment the basic research
division has received many major
grants from the NIH and other
funding organizations and much
acclaim for its work. This was due
to the direct efforts of Dr. Einhorn.
In 1989, an orthopaedic
library located at the Boston City
Hospital campus was funded
through a donation by the Leach
family and augmented by
contributions by the BU
Orthopaedic Alumni Association.
Dr. G. Richard Paul had for some
years been the organizing force
behind the Alumni Association and
was the key figure in this funding
effort. This made it possible to well
stock the library. In 1997, through
the Leach family, funds were
donated to establish the Leach
17Aceso
Visiting Professorship and Dr.
Charles Rockwood of San Antonio,
Texas, became the first guest
lecturer in the fall of 1998.
Another major change came
about in 1997 when Dr. Einhorn
persuaded Dr. Paul Tornetta to
come from the New York
City/Brooklyn area to assume the
position of Chief at Boston City
Hospital and Vice Chairman for
Academic Affairs. Dr. Tornetta and
his staff have restored that hospital
to a position in trauma similar to or
exceeding its halcyon days of the
'70s and '80s. His emphasis on
patient care and attention to detail
further enhance the program.
In over 60 years,
Orthopaedic Program #66 has
evolved from the time of a single
resident at Boston City and one
fellow at Lahey to its present status.
While the inception of the program
can be dated to 1950 and the Lahey
Clinic and Boston City Hospital, its
modern birth as a
University program
rightfully starts in
1970, with the
association with
Boston University.
To its previous
clinical excellence
highlighted by the
Lahey Clinic, University Hospital,
and the Shriners Hospital, the new
Boston University Orthopaedic
leadership starting in 1997 has
brought an outstanding basic
science research program and
sound administrative foundation.
To this is added the strong trauma
program at BCH and the constantly
upgraded teaching program and
patient base at the Lahey Clinic.
Each of these pieces leaves Program
#66 well positioned for the future,
as I write this history in 2002. The
over 130 members of the Boston
University Orthopaedic Alumni
Association attest to its past history,
and they have provided excellent
guest lecturers for the Alumni
Teaching Day, a tradition
established by Dr. Einhorn in 1998
and later named for Dr. G. Richard
Paul. Program #66 has a solid past
and is well­positioned by its
leadership for a bright future.
The Last Decade
By G. Richard Paul
The last decade has witnessed
tremendous growth of the
Department, in both the volume
and complexity of the surgical
procedures, the stature of the
Department as a Level 1 Trauma
Center, and the leadership role of
the attending staff members in their
respective specialty organizations.
The attending staff, all of whom are
fellowship­trained, and the
resident staff routinely
make presentations at
regional and national
meetings. The attending
staff includes Thomas
Einhorn (total joint
arthroplasty), Paul Tornetta
(orthopaedic trauma
reconstruction), Bill Creevy (sports
medicine and orthopaedic trauma
reconstruction), Brian Silvia (total
joint arthroplasty), Xinning Li
(sports medicine), Tony Tannoury
(spine trauma and reconstruction),
Chadi Tannoury (spine trauma),
Rob Nicoletta (sports medicine),
Andrew Stein (hand
reconstruction), Andrew Jawa
(hand reconstruction), and
Desmond Brown (pediatric
orthopaedics).
The attending staffs of the
affiliated hospitals in the residency
program (Lahey Clinic Medical
Center, Shriners Hospital for
Children) likewise are all
fellowship­trained and are leaders
in their respective specialty
organizations.
Current and former
attending surgeons include: Robert
E. Leach (founding chairman of BU
Department of Orthopaedic
Surgery, Editor Emeritus of The
American Journal of Sports Medicine,
Treasurer of American Board of
Orthopaedic Surgery, Deputy
Editor of Clinical Orthopaedics and
Related Research), David Segal
(founding member of Orthopaedic
Trauma Association; Chairman,
Department of Orthopaedic Surgery
Hadassah Medical Center,
Jerusalem, Israel), Thomas Einhorn
(Editor, JBJS Reviews; formerly
Deputy Editor of JBJS), Paul
Tornetta (President, Orthopaedic
Trauma Association; editorial staff
of Journal of Orthopaedic Trauma),
Tim Foster (Associate Editor,
American Journal of Sports Medicine),
William Creevy (VP, Boston
Medical Center / CEO BUSM
Faculty Practice Foundation), and
William Healy (Chairman Emeritus,
Department of Orthopaedic Surgery
Lahey Clinic Foundation).
From a program that
accepted one resident for one year
of training in 1950 to a program that
accepts five residents for five years
of training in 2013, Boston
University Department of
Orthopaedic Surgery / Orthopaedic
Residency Program #66 has
evolved into a nationally prominent
program which is training the
future generation of leaders in
orthopaedic surgery.
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Orthopaedic Program#66 has evolvedfrom the time of asingle resident atBoston City and onefellow at Lahey to itspresent status.
Beautiful BCH:A Photo Essay of 19th Century Views of the Boston City Hospital
James S. Brust, MDBoston University School of MedicineClass of 1968
Peters OtlansBoston University School of MedicineMD Candidate, Class of 2014
Photographic Essay
ne index of theintelligence andpublic spirit of acommunity is theway in which it provides for the needsof the sick and poor. Boston, inestablishing and maintaining aMunicipal Hospital […] has givenproof of a humanitarian spirit and acivic intelligence second to no city inthe United States,” said early BCHsuperintendent George Rowe, MD. Inaddition to its symbolic value to thecommunity, and the good medicalcare provided there, the originalBoston City Hospital was a beautiful
complex. Erected in 1864, just aspopularly priced photographs werebecoming widely available,photographers made and sold manyimages of BCH in its early years,which was a mark of civic pride on thepart of those who purchased thesepictures.This article presents a group of 19thcentury photographs of the BostonCity Hospital. Most are stereographs(also known as stereo views); doubleimages mounted on a card, made by acamera with two lenses spaced thesame distance apart as human eyes.When seen through a special viewer,
they gave a three dimensional effect,very well suited for scenic, landscape,and architectural photographs.Though some historical informationis included in the captions, this articleis in no way meant to be acomprehensive account of thehospital’s early years, but rather anaesthetic look back at a public buildingcomplex that was as beautiful as it washelpful and important.All illustrations in this article arefrom the collection of the BostonUniversity Medical Center AlumniMedical Library, donated by authorJames Brust.
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In addition to full time practice, Dr. Brust is an independent historian, specializing in 19th century popular printsand photographs, occasionally crossing over into medical topics including Mary Lincoln. He has written overforty journal articles, several book chapters, and is a coauthor of the book Where Custer Fell, Photographs ofthe Little Bighorn Battlefield Then and Now (University of Oklahoma Press, 2005). Since 1995, Dr. Brusthas been acquiring and donating historical artifacts relating to BUSM and the Boston City Hospital,
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Figure 1: Anonymous (i.e. no photographer identified) stereograph, two albumen silver prints,
each 3 x 3 inches, mounted on a 3 3/8 x 7 inch card (actual size shown). This is the typical
appearance of a 19th century stereo view. In subsequent illustrations we have shown only one
side of the stereograph, oftentimes enlarged to make the image details more clear (see Figure 2
for an enlargement of this view).
Figure 2: Enlarged detail of Figure 1. This is an early view, likely taken in the 1860s. It shows the three most
prominent of the original buildings. In the center is the magnificent Administration Building with tall columns and
stately dome, its apex rising to a height of 148 feet. [2] On the left is Pavilion I, the surgical pavilion with wards A, B,
C, and D. On the right Pavilion II housed medical wards E, F, G, and H. Both were connected to the Administration
Building by a curved, covered colonnade. Though not currently marked with interpretive signage about their
origin, the two Pavilions still stand today, now named BCD (left) and FGH (right) after the wards they once
contained (see Figure 14). The other original building was a boiler house directly behind the Administration
Building, hence not visible in this photograph. The building seen in the distance behind the right colonnade is
probably Pavilion III, built two years later (about 1866) to house septic cases requiring isolation. In the foreground is
Harrison Avenue, at the time a dirt street. The beauty of the architecture and layout of these buildings is evident.
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Figure 3: This map of BCH and the adjacent area by G.M. Hopkins & Co. gives a better view of the relative locations
of the buildings shown in Figures 1 & 2, which form a “Y” shaped configuration in the area marked “City Hospital.”
The prongs of the “Y” are Pavilions I (right) and II (left) reaching up toward Harrison Avenue, which angles across
the top of the map. The lower sections of the prongs are the curved, covered colonnades, which then connect to the
administration building in the center, its dome represented by a circle. The lower section of the “Y” goes straight
down to the boiler house that fronts on Albany Street. Pavilion III is the offshoot building to the left of the base of
the “Y.” Though published in 1874, this map must have been made a year or more earlier, as it still shows the New
England Female Medical College to the right of the City Hospital grounds, even though it had become the Boston
University School of Medicine the year before. But this was before the major changes to BCH outlined in Figure 8­10
below.
Figure 4: This elevated close up of the
domed Administration Building,
probably taken from Pavilion I, gives
a better view of its architectural
details. The boiler house with its
smokestack, directly behind the
domed structure, is visible from this
angle.
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Figure 5: A ground level closeup of the domed
Administration Building and the curved paths
leading to it. Unlike most architectural views of
that era, this one contains people. On the right a
woman in a long dress of that period approaches
along the path, while in the background a man
sits on the buttress on the left side of the wide
stone stairway. They give scale to the image, but
also remind us that this hospital was a place that
cared for people.
Figure 6: Another relatively early view, this one
taken on an angle that shows most of Pavilion I but
only the front corner of Pavilion II. In the
foreground, cobblestones have replaced the plain
dirt seen along Harrison Avenue in Figures 1 and 2.
Figure 7: An unusual view taken from behind
the Administration Building, looking toward
Harrison Avenue. The curved colonnades lead to
the backs of Pavilions I and II. On the far left, the
front corner of the steam house is just barely
seen. And though it doesn’t show well in this
scan, what appears to be a vegetable garden fills
the space to the right of the domed building. At
the far right, the Church of the Immaculate
Conception, which still stands, is seen. Its corner
stone was laid in 1859, thus predating BCH.
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Figure 8: This is an important transitional
view. On the right, the covered colonnade
now runs only a short distance before
meeting a new building, its construction
scaffolds still in place. The same scaffolding
is also seen on the left, though the actual
new building on that side is outside the
field of view of this photograph.
Figure 9: This map published by G.W. Bromley & Co. in 1883 shows the relative positioning of the two new
buildings between the original pavilions and the Administration Building. As in Figure 3, Harrison Avenue angles
across the top of the map. The words “City Hospital” are printed right through the two new buildings and the
domed Administration Building.
Over the hospital’s first decade, the population of the city grew, and the demand for beds increased. In 1874, the
trustees and medical staff convinced the City Council to appropriate funds to enlarge the medical and surgical
wards. This was accomplished by constructing two new buildings between the existing Pavilions I and II and the
Administration Building on either side. The covered colonnades were thus shortened on both sides as these new
buildings filled most of the space they had occupied.
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Figure 10: This is perhaps the best 19th century view of the Boston City Hospital, partly because the original is a
larger format, single 4 x 6 inch photograph which gives greater detail than a 3 x 3 stereo half. The two new buildings
have been completed. It was said “they had the same general style as the two older pavilions,[…]and care was taken
to place them agreeably in relation to the Administration Building.” [3] The result was a clear cut aesthetic success.
This front façade view of the Boston City Hospital, taken across Harrison Avenue from the entrance to Worcester
Square (see the corner sections of pavement in the foreground on either side) inspired numerous engravings that
appeared in books and periodicals, disseminating this image to a much wider audience (see Figures 11 and 12).
Figures 11 & 12: Two engravings of the
front façade view of the Boston City
Hospital, the top one from King’s Handbook
of Boston, [4] the other from A History of the
Boston City Hospital. [5] Based on
photographs like the one in Figure 10, this
became the signature view of BCH. In the
era before about 1890, when photographs
could not be directly reproduced on the
printed page, engravings such as these in
books and periodicals brought this image
to a wide audience.
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Figure 13: The Boston City Hospital became an
architectural landmark for the entire South End.
The subject of this photograph is Worcester
Square, taken from the Washington Street side. But
the most noticeable structure is the domed BCH
Administrative Building across Harrison Avenue
in the background.
Figure 14: Modern comparison photo on
the bottom, taken by author James Brust
in 2013. The view is across Harrison
Avenue from the entrance to Worcester
Square. The domed Administration
Building was removed in the 1930s, the
additional medical and surgical
buildings added in the 1870s are no
longer present, and no trace remains of
the covered colonnades. But the original
Pavilions I and II still stand, now named
BCD (left) and FGH (right). Those letters
were the names of wards in those
buildings. These were the first two
Boston City Hospital structures used for
patient care when BCH opened in 1864.
Thankfully they still stand ­­­ they ought
to be preserved, marked, and
remembered.
Notes:
[1] Cheever DW, Gay GW, Mason AL,
Blake JB, eds. A History of the Boston City
Hospital, From Its Foundation Until 1904.
Boston: Municipal Printing Office; 1906.
Page 1.
[2] Ibid, 8.
[3] Ibid., 11­12.
[4] King M. King’s Handbook of Boston,
Profusely Illustrated. Boston: Moses King
Publisher; 1878. Page opp. 208.
This book was enormously popular, and
reissued on a yearly basis for over a
decade, with this view of the Boston
City Hospital in each printing.
[5] Cheever, frontispiece.
Pictures of Babies:Massachusetts Memorial Hospitals' Outreach toServicemen in WWII
A'Llyn Ettien, MLISHead of Technical ServicesBoston University Alumni Medical Library
On Campus
nimpressive at first
look, one plain
manila folder in the
Medical Library
Archives contains
what must be among
the most interesting historical
collections on the Boston University
Medical Campus. Labeled
“Servicemens’ replies
acknowledging pictures of babies
1943­45”, the folder contains 163
letters, typed or handwritten, on
yellowing paper ranging from
irregularly shaped sheets to
stationary with the imprint of
organizations like the United States
Navy, the American Red Cross, and
many others. As the label states,
these letters express the
appreciation of servicemen in the
U.S. military who received
photographs of their newborn
babies, and they come from as near
as Dorchester, or as far away as
India, China, England, the
Philippines, and “somewhere at
sea.”
The letters are held in the
archived records of the
Massachusetts Memorial Hospitals
(MMH), BUSM’s affiliated hospital
during the war years. That
relationship has continued through
several name changes (to University
Hospital, BU Medical Center
Hospital, and finally, after the
merger with Boston City Hospital,
to Boston Medical Center, today),
making this collection part of just
one chapter in the complex history
of the BU Medical Campus.
Specific context is
unfortunately scanty, with nothing
in the Archives except the labeled
folder and the letters themselves.
We can see that the MMH Hospital
Aid Association arranged to send a
photograph of a mother and her
newborn to the deployed father
whenever a serviceman’s wife
delivered a baby at the hospital, but
how many such babies were born,
the operational dates, costs and
organization of the program, and
other information is unclear. Still,
it’s possible to gather plenty of
fascinating details.
One imagines it must have
been a satisfying task for the person
responsible for typing a letter and
sending the photograph on its
journey: an opportunity to give
good news and joy to someone who
might be assumed to have special
need of it. Judging from the
responses, this service was often
unexpected. The photos were
received, in the words of two
writers, as a “most welcomed
surprise,” and an idea “most novel
and highly appreciated.”
In retrospect a photo of his
new baby may seem an obvious
way to brighten a serviceman’s day.
Yet the above comments, along
with another soldier’s statement
that “It is one of the best things I’ve
heard of since I’ve been in the
service,” suggest that not every
hospital had an Aid Association
able to provide this encouragement.
In fact, this may have been a special
benefit to delivering at MMH. The
program, one man writes, “is a very
thoughtful and splendid idea, and if
other hospitals […] only knew of
the joy and happiness received […]
I’m sure they would also adopt
such a very fine policy.”
Unfortunately, none of the
photographs are archived, but we
do have an example of the note that
U
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accompanied them. A brief, matter­
of­fact statement, it gives the date
and time of birth, the child’s sex
and weight, and says, simply,
“Thinking it would add to your
happiness to have a picture of your
new son [or daughter], a
photograph is enclosed.”
The pictures were not
always unexpected: women, aware
of the photograph and its purpose,
may have mentioned it to their
husbands in their own letters, and it
must sometimes have been a matter
of which envelope arrived first. One
soldier says, “I was told that you
were sending me a picture of my
wife and baby and I’ve been
waiting patiently ever since.” (He
goes on to say, “But may I add it
was certainly worth waiting for.”)
One letter observes that the
photo was taken by Bob Keller,
whom the writer knew as someone
“active with the United War Fund
for many years.” No information
about Mr. Keller is archived, but
this suggests he was the
photographer (or one of multiple
photographers), retained by the Aid
Association to visit the hospital and
take the pictures. This must have
been satisfying work, knowing that
the photo would be welcomed by
far­off fathers, helping to assure
them of the substance and reality of
a child they might not see for
months. As one man wrote, “It was
doubly reassuring to me after my
long wait to see that he was well in
addition to hearing it.”
Others describe the pictures
as “the most thoughtfull [sic] gift
that I have received from any
society […] during my army
career,” and “the best gift I have
ever gotten.” Many writers also
mention that they will cherish the
picture and carry it with them. This
must have been wonderful
encouragement for Aid Association
members, providing clear
confirmation that their work was
appreciated.
At varying lengths and in
the different words chosen by each
writer, the letters explain how
much it meant to men stationed in
foreign lands or at sea to receive a
picture of a child they had yet to see
in person (and perhaps, in some
cases, would not live to see). Some,
written after a return home, suggest
the strength of those feelings: even
after returning to Brookline,
Melrose, Wakefield and other local
towns, with the adjustments of re­
entry to civilian life, they felt it
important to write a note to the
hospital superintendent, thanking
him and the Aid Association for the
chance to see their new baby as
soon as possible.
Today, when nearly every
new mother delivering at BMC
must own a camera and/or a phone
capable of taking and sending
pictures, it’s unlikely anyone would
much appreciate the hospital
sending a photographer to snap a
picture for a military parent. In the
mid­1940s, however, when a much
less casual relationship to
photography prevailed, it must
have been a remarkable and
precious thing to receive that first
image of a newborn child.
The mailing was not
entirely selfless: the Aid Association
did not miss the opportunity for
promotion. The letter with the
baby’s birth information included a
paragraph explaining that the
picture was provided “due to the
thoughtfulness of the members of
the Aid Association […] made
possible by use of the money the
Association has provided.” A pre­
addressed envelope was also
included, in stated anticipation that
fathers would like to “acknowledge
receipt” of the pictures. (This
envelope remains attached to many
letters, demonstrating the still­true
fact that it’s always good for the
response rate to make replying as
easy as possible.)
These letters thus represent
a partly prompted response,
perhaps as much as a spontaneous
outpouring of gratitude. Indeed, at
least one soldier declined to send a
grateful note, which works to our
advantage today: our example of
the text that accompanied the
photos is one of these Aid
Association letters, returned with a
crisp “Receipt acknowledged”
scrawled at the bottom above the
signature of the father. Whether this
man was busier than others, less
impressed with the art of
photography, or simply not given to
wordy declarations, is impossible to
say. Regardless, his laconic reply is
appreciated now, since it gives us
the content of the letters sent along
with the pictures; something we
could otherwise only guess at.
Many letters are perfect
examples of the classic thank­you
prescribed by etiquette advisors,
with specific, positive mention of
the item received (“The picture
came out swell”) and how pleased
the recipient is (“It really is a great
thing to have a picture of the baby
at such a young age”). If necessary,
an apology is offered for the
lateness of a reply, usually
described as due to a delay in
receipt of the picture, or difficulty
writing (“I’ve just returned from a
furlough, and it’s been waiting here
for me all that time,” or “I’m living
under combat conditions, and even
getting the paper and envelope to
write was a lucky stroke”). Another
soldier, as long as he was writing,
took the opportunity to request
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assistance, citing Circular No. 17
and asking the Aid Association to
let his wife know she shouldn’t pay
for medical services covered by the
War Department.
Even if prompted by the
written expectation that they would
send a thank­you note, the personal
phrasing and sincere pleasure
expressed in many of these letters is
clear evidence that the servicemen
sincerely valued this program.
While there is obviously a strong
common theme to the letters, it’s
fascinating to see the variation in
the way these men approached the
task. Some are rather informal,
signing off with a first name, while
others spell out their full military
title. Some have typed their letters,
which is often more legible but
which also conceals the sense of
personality that can show through
in the handwritten notes.
These latter pieces are
neatly printed in block letters, or
written out in elegant script, or
quickly scrawled, as if the writer
simply wanted to discharge a duty
and move on. Some suggest ease
and fluency with the written word,
while others are somewhat clumsy,
likely displaying varying levels of
education and familiarity with the
forms of the day (“I remain, very
truly yours,” etc.). This hints at the
way in which wartime, like the
experience of the faraway birth of a
child, can blur socioeconomic lines;
regardless of their hometown,
civilian profession or level of
education, all these men write as
members of the United States
military and as fathers of newborn
children, all having benefited from
the same hospital program.
Most writers,
understandably hesitating to speak
with confidence about a child they
didn’t yet know in person, maintain
a certain reserve regarding their
infants, generally referring to him
or her as “the baby” and rarely
mentioning a name. This makes
especially interesting the letters in
which men do talk about their
children.
One writer, clearly thinking
of his daughter as a specific person
already, says he “can hardly wait
for a leave and a chance to meet the
young lady who I understand is
already taking sunbaths and
carrying on in similar shocking
ways!” Another imagines his new
son following in his footsteps,
saying he is “indeed a happy father
to have had a son who will
someday take my place in the
Marines.”
These letters would likely
not be especially valuable from a
military historical standpoint. They
tell us nothing about the course of
the war, or the everyday experience
of the men who fought. At most,
they show some of the many places
around the world in which U.S.
servicemen found themselves
during these years.
What they offer instead of
news about battles and troop
movements is a series of small
glimpses of the ways in which life
at home went on, and institutions
attempted to share that continuity
by allowing for enjoyment of a
broadly human, yet profoundly
personal moment. Civilians at home
may never truly understand the
soldier’s wartime reality, but they
can try to share their own news, to
ground the wanderer and remind
him of the world waiting for him.
The existence of this program
speaks eloquently of the way non­
military institutions sought to
support the servicemen abroad
during the years of World War II,
and highlights the uniquely
intimate ability of a hospital to
touch a person’s life at the most
vulnerable and momentous of
times.
‘You have a child,’ the
photos said. ‘You may be far away,
in an environment where something
like birth is nearly irrelevant, but
see, that world still exists: you have
a child, and here is a picture of that
tiny new face.’
There is evidence that the
program was perceived in this
supportive fashion. One man wrote
“It is indeed gratifying to know that
we in the service have people like
you behind us,” while another
states, “You won’t know what a
consolation it is to see such
goodness all around me.” Finally,
another man, speaking no doubt for
many: “Let’s hope & pray this war
with Japan ends soon so the service
men & women can return to the
land & loved ones they adore.”
At this remove in time, and
with nothing more to go on, we can
only hope they all made it safely
home, and that their later lives, and
the lives of their sons and daughters
growing up in the busy years after
the war, were happy ones. Some of
those children likely still live in the
neighborhoods and towns around
Boston and the BU Medical
Campus. Perhaps some of those
photos are still tucked into old
family albums, little slivers of
history mutely speaking of the way
life moves on even in the midst of
war’s uncertainty, and people reach
out to others to offer what comfort
and support they can.
All quotes taken from letters in the folder
“Hospital Aid Assn. WWII: Servicemens’
replies acknowledging pictures of babies
1943­45” in the Boston University Alumni
Medical Library Archives.
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The Cincinnati Cholera Epidemic of1873 as a Force in 19th CenturyUrban Community Dynamics
Theodore W. Eversole, PhDDepartment of HistoryWestern Kentucky University
Feature
ccording to many
historians of medicine,
cholera was la première
epidémie du XIXe siècle.
The historiography of
cholera is indeed vast, drawing the
steady attention of a wide body of
scholars who have since the 1980s
increasingly focused upon the
examination of cholera’s epidemic
consequences on regional or local
areas. Equally important, cholera
research also intersects with key
historical areas such as
transportation, migration, public
health development, and
urbanization. Given its broad
variety of impacts, epidemic
cholera provides a useful backdrop
to better understand how its
visitation could affect important
emerging communities such as the
Ohio River city of Cincinnati in the
1870s. [1]
One of the most feared
diseases of the nineteenth century,
cholera’s causation remained a
mysterious quest throughout most
of the century. For the majority of
these years, the medical consensus
believed that miasma was cholera’s
principal causal agent. However,
causes other than exposure to
poisonous bad air, such as the
actions of the sun, moon, and stars,
among many other diverse theories,
were often propagated in the era’s
medical correspondence to explain
cholera’s frightful presence.
Epidemic cholera first
appeared in Europe in 1817, and
was believed to have arrived from
India spreading along trade,
military, and pilgrimage routes. As
the century progressed, the impact
of commerce, population
movement, and urban living
combined to set the stage for a
series of worldwide epidemics
whose most significant waves
struck between 1829 and 1875. The
last major western epidemic
reached Europe in 1892. Hamburg,
Germany, a key immigrant
embarkation point, particularly
suffered during this visitation with
over 8,000 recorded deaths. [2] As
historian Charles Rosenberg
asserted, “Cholera was the classic
epidemic disease of the nineteenth
century, as plague had been of the
fourteenth. When cholera first
appeared in the United States in33
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1832, yellow fever and small pox,
the great epidemic diseases of the
previous two centuries, were no
longer truly national problems.” [3]
After mid­century the threat of
cholera stimulated more
coordinated community responses,
especially as medical understanding
evolved concerning the social
conditions that increased cholera’s
virulence and death rates. As the
nineteenth century progressed, the
menace of cholera helped feed the
urban reform impulse as local areas
looked to eliminate the breeding
grounds of infection.
During these years, cholera
was clearly a scourge that brought
panic wherever it appeared. The
impact of the comma bacillus was
truly devastating, and the speed at
which cholera killed was
particularly frightening. The onset
of symptoms brought about bouts
of rice water­like diarrhea,
vomiting, and cramping, but it was
the resulting, and often rapid,
dehydration that was most
shocking, frequently bringing death
within a matter of hours. Upon
death, bodies were frequently left
curled into a fetal position and were
subsequently buried in such a state.
Those affected would:
shrink into a wizened character of his/her
former self within a few hours, while
ruptured capillaries discolored the skin,
turning it black and blue. The effect was to
make mortality uniquely visible: patterns of
bodily decay were exacerbated and
accelerated as in a time lapse motion
picture, to remind all who saw it of death’s
ugly horror and utter inevitability. [4]
Nineteenth century
treatments to meet such a horrible
disease varied over the decades,
and produced a constantly
changing array of nostrums and
remedies, including applications of
vinegar, mustard, laudanum, and
calomel as well as other ingredients
drawn from the age’s materia medica.
Bloodletting and assorted baths
were also tried, but all without
effect. In terms of curative
properties, death rates throughout
the century showed little variation
between those
medically treated
with these and
other cures, and
those totally
lacking medical
intervention.
It would
not be until 1883
that future Nobel
prize winner Dr. Robert Koch
(1843­1910) identified the comma
bacillus as the cause of cholera. In
doing so he helped to confirm a
pathogenic explanation for this
contagious disease. Yet even in the
face of Koch’s evidence, there were
still prominent scientists such as
Munich’s Max von Pettenkofer
(1818­1901) who as late as 1884 still
professed a belief in miasma as
cholera’s causative agent. An
additional step towards real
prevention came in 1893 when Dr.
Waldemar Haffline (1860­1930)
produced the first successful
vaccine for cholera, which offered a
measure of hope for more
systematic control.
Although effective
treatments now exist, including
vaccines and oral rehydration
therapies, cholera remains a serious
disease whose continued presence
can be found in the Middle East and
Africa, where serious epidemics
occurred in the 1960s and 1970s. In
1991 cholera again struck the
Americas, for the first time in 100
years, erupting in Peru where it
spread to infect some 400,000
people worldwide and cause 4,000
deaths. Cholera’s continuing ability
to kill was once more evidenced
during a 1994 outbreak in Zaire,
which killed 50,000 refugees, and
even more recently in Haiti where
hundreds of thousands have been
affected since the recent earthquake.
[5]
As early as 1854,
Dr. John Snow of
London suggested that
cholera’s spread could be
traced to contaminated
drinking water. His
investigations examined
water collected from the
River Thames, with
particular attention
given to those suppliers who drew
their water from sections of river
water not far from sewage outlet
pipes. From his research, Snow
produced convincing data, and
suggested preventative courses of
action; however, he lacked a
universally acknowledged causative
agent such as the microbe that
could be attached to the contagion’s
spread.
Although Snow was on the
right track, his work was slow to
influence public health policy, or
convince the medical community
that infected water was a source of
transmission. Nevertheless, in time
epidemic diseases such as cholera
did help establish boards of health.
As the boards’ presence became
more readily accepted within city
bureaucracies, they could focus
their attention upon improving
urban hygiene. The initial public
hygiene drive was led by England’s
Secretary of the Poor Law
Commission, Edwin Chadwick. In
1842 Chadwick published his Report
into the Sanitary Conditions of the
Labouring Population in Britain which
drew an early link between urban
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living conditions and disease.
However, in Britain and elsewhere,
the boards of health that were
created during the 1840s and later
were often temporary, lacked the
full powers of sanitary enforcement,
and failed to understand the actual
nature of disease. Taken as a whole,
such boards were fairly ineffective
when an epidemic struck. In
addition, local community leaders
were fearful of the bad publicity a
cholera epidemic could have on
ordinary business activities.
Nevertheless, even in the face of
such limitations, by the 1860s the
board of health concept had spread
to the United States, and such
boards would in future decades
compel urban areas across the
nation to subscribe to the general
tenets of sanitary reform as a means
of disease control. [6]
The Cincinnati Cholera Epidemic
of 1873
Cincinnati’s last major
battle with cholera occurred in 1873.
By the beginning of that decade
Cincinnati was the third leading
industrial city in the nation and a
manufacturing and commercial
base for an expanding nation, facts
which gave substance to the city’s
claim to be the “Queen City of the
West.” Cincinnati’s population of
over 200,000 lived for the most part
in densely crowded housing in the
city’s central basin, which stretched
north from the edge of the Ohio
River for over a mile. Cincinnati
was also a transport nexus as it sat
at the terminus of the Miami and
Erie Canals, and after the 1850s its
expanding railroad links tied the
area to New York, Chicago, and
points south. In addition, vibrant
riverboat traffic provided both
upriver accesses to Pittsburgh and
downriver connections all the way
to New Orleans.
By the 1860s new more
salubrious suburbs were planted
along the surrounding hillsides,
which extended the city’s radius by
over four miles from the center. In
addition, Cincinnati was a city of
immigrants, part of the late 1840s
national surge in immigrant
arrivals. As the census from these
years revealed, 27% of the local
population was German­born, and
the percentage of the work force
that was German was over 40%. [7]
It was these immigrant groups,
many of whom lived in crowded
and poor conditions, that often
suffered the brunt of
cholera’s effects and
took the blame for
the spread of the
disease.
Cholera had
struck Cincinnati
before, arriving first
in 1832­34. This first
encounter produced
831 deaths. Cholera
returned, between
1848 and 1850 and
claimed a further 4,114 lives, and
appeared again in 1866 when it
killed an additional 2,028 city
residents. However, by the time of
the 1866 epidemic, although as
severe as before, the city had
evolved in terms of its community
responses. Alan I. Marcus’
important research has indicated
attitudes had changed and these
new circumstances “stemmed
directly from the notions of cities as
social units and health as a discrete
public problem.” [8] As Marcus
further stated, “The 1866 cholera
outbreak made it politically
inexpedient and dangerous to
pursue city­state and interest group
squabbles without first erecting
health departments in some form.”
[9] Therefore, city boards of health
did not simply appear but were a
concerted response in light of
political and popular pressures. In
addition, after 1865 there was a
clear move toward extending board
powers to make for a more truly
functional organization. According
to Marcus’ analysis, “two critical
issues” had to be resolved: “the
battle for medical primacy” and the
“contest between city and state for
municipal control.” [10] Such
political contests, as well as medical
debates over cholera’s causes,
made preparation for epidemics
more difficult. However, by 1867 a
new city health law
was passed that
firmly established a
health board with tax
powers and staff to
deliver improved
sanitary control and
enforce new health
codes. [11]
Although progress
had been made in
reforming health
provision along with
other aspects of city government,
1870s Cincinnati was wracked with
numerous concerns, including
political scandals and rivalries as
well as economic divides, which
created a generally unpleasant
operating environment when
significant crises occurred. The
national economic recession of 1873
made matters worse and
contributed to the growing labor
unrest of the period, which saw the
city average twenty­five serious
strikes a year during the 1870s.
Economic challenges, political
discord, and lost markets to cities
further west all added to a general
spirit of urban malaise. As
sociologist Jeffrey Haydu stated,
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“Cincinnatians felt besieged by
urban social ills, from intemperance
and prostitution to violent crime
and they criticized city officials for
being too corrupt or incompetent to
maintain order.” [12]
Yet it was precisely in such
political and social circumstances
that Cincinnati’s last major cholera
attack occurred. The 1873 epidemic
produced 207 deaths out of a total
city mortality of 5,641 for that year.
[13] Although the civic health
framework had changed, as did
city expectations, cholera remained
a deadly threat to many local
residents and a charged political
issue for local governance.
Cholera’s Arrival and Infestation
The 1873 cholera epidemic
first erupted in New Orleans on
February 9, 1873, and subsequently
traveled north aboard the
steamboat John Kilgore, which
suffered three cholera deaths before
arriving in Cincinnati on May 23,
1873. [14] The first fatal case with
city origins was that of Philatine
Gundlock, aged 45, of 57 Oliver
Street, which occurred on June 14,
1873 in an area close to the crowded
Over the Rhine area near the city
center. By the end of July, 117
deaths had followed, and the
disease didn’t fully abate until
October 18, 1873.
Dr. J. J. Quinn, the city
health officer, believed, as reflected
in his 1873 report, that “no
connection can be established
between the first fatal case of
cholera and any steamboat, landing,
railroad depots, imported cholera
patients, or persons from a locality
where the disease has been
prevailing.” [15] Furthermore,
Quinn’s viewpoints were seen as
authoritative since he served as a
representative of the city's official
public health organization. Quinn’s
conclusion suggested that “cholera
required certain geological and
meteorological conditions for its
development,” and “resulted
through the nervous system by
exhaustion, fear, anxiety, or other
depressing mental emotion;
through the digestive organs by
imprudence in eating and drinking;
and through respiratory and
circulatory systems, by inhalation of
noxious vapors or of vitiated and
impure air.” [16] In addition,
Quinn’s report suggested that
Cincinnati's 1873 bowel disorders
were, perhaps, not even “true"
cholera, and he further declared,
"The epidemic furnished no proofs
of contagioness. Indeed very few of
the cases were at all reconcilable
with the theory of contagion.” [17]
In contrast the federal
official inquiry into the epidemic,
the Cholera Epidemic of 1873 in the
United States, differed in several
substantial ways from Quinn’s
assessment of the epidemic. The
federal inquiry was unequivocal in
its charge that “the cholera
epidemic was carried from New
Orleans to Cincinnati by human
beings,” and argued that “the first
cases of cholera occurred in
Cincinnati after the arrival of the
steamboat, John Kilgore, from New
Orleans.” [18] This document also
concluded that the first cases had a
connection to the steamboat landing
and other cases broke out in the
vicinity of the first and second
cases. [19] The national report
suggested the possibility that
cholera was contagious and spread
through specific contacts and city
locations. This conclusion showed
an early awareness of infectious
transmission, a decade before
Koch’s confirmation, and further
argued that “sanitary science” as
seen in Europe was the solution to
the devastating problems posed by
cholera.
On the local level, there
were others from the medical
community who likewise contested
Quinn’s official version of the
epidemic of 1873, and, in turn,
endorsed the national report’s
verdict. For example, Dr. F.
Dowling, a physician based at 9th
and Linn streets close to many of
the cholera cases, wrote in 1873, that
the “present epidemic has passed
along routes of travel, has been
propagated by water contaminated
with faecal matter, has attacked
most freely those living in low and
crowded portions of cities, has
produced in its victims all the
symptoms and results of true
cholera, and is therefore, in our
opinion, nothing else than cholera.”
[20]
Since it is now clearly
understood that contaminated
water is the vehicle most often
associated with cholera's
transmission, the state of
Cincinnati's sanitation in 1873 had a
direct bearing on the history of the
1873 epidemic. The official Quinn
report stated that at the time of the
outbreak of the disease in
Cincinnati “the streets and alleys
were clean, and the city [was]
generally in a fair sanitary
condition.” [21] The idea was also
promoted that “the water supply of
Cincinnati (was) regarded as among
the healthiest furnished any city in
the union." [22] This “healthy” city
water, for the most part, was taken
from the Ohio River, and this water
was assumed to be safe for it was
gathered from the channel beyond
reach of shore drainage. [23] In
addition, to better distribute the
city's water, 783 hydrants, and six
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plus miles of new pipe were erected
in 1873, giving Cincinnati 154 miles
of total water pipe. For sewage
purposes, the city, since 1858, was
divided into two separate districts:
the one lying west of Freeman,
between Eighth and Bank, and the
other comprising that portion east
of Freeman, and also that west of
Freeman and south of Eighth. In
both instances, the Ohio River, the
source of the city's water supply,
was the final receptacle for the city's
untreated waste. [24]
As was established six
years previously, a full time,
permanent board of health was
empowered to oversee the city’s
general health and sanitation and
by 1871 had divided the city into six
health districts. To assist the board
of health, it was the “duty of the
mayor to detail from the regular
police of the city, or to make new
appointments for the purpose, such
number of policemen as the board
may require for the enforcement of
proper sanitary measures.” [25]
This “sanitary squad” was in theory
under the exclusive control of the
city’s board of health. However,
during 1873, the board’s control of
the sanitary squad was transferred
to the Board of Commissioners of
Police, and efficient enforcement
was apparently lost. It is unclear
why the transfer occurred, but the
police commissioners did not
support the cleanup effort and
disregarded Board measures.
Furthermore, there were too few
patrolmen assigned as sanitary
inspectors so little was actually
accomplished. This situation though
did not go unchallenged at the time,
for critics were beginning to see the
need for specific educational
qualifications for those undertaking
sanitary inspections. [26] Professor
Marcus linked this and other
criticisms to a number of political
issues that arose in the 1870s
involving irregularities in the
comptroller’s office, police
department, board of city
improvements and board of
education. [27]
Nevertheless, even in the
face of political factions and
failures, over 13,174 nuisances were
reported during the epidemic year,
in a city that purported to be in fair
sanitary condition. [28] Besides
problems involving control of the
sanitary squad, the board of health
also suffered in 1873 from a lack of
cooperation with the board of the
sewage commission, an essential
agency in the development of an
effective and coordinated public
health policy. [29] It was also not
until 1889 that the city
recommended the compulsory
connection of all houses to the
municipal sewage system, a fact
that greatly helped the board of
health’s regulation of the disposal
of household waste. [30]
The Cincinnati press
provided active coverage of the
epidemic throughout its course.
Only days after the first fatality,
and in advance of many in the
medical community, a report
appeared which stated that “the
disease was propagated by the
excremental discharges of persons
affected by the choleric poisons,
aided by local causes.” [31] The
Daily Gazette went on to
recommend whole scale
purification, disinfection, and
sanitary cleansing. [32] Local
conditions were often vividly
described and lamented. Reports
appeared describing neglected
privies, filth sodden grounds, foul
cellars, poorly drained
surroundings, foul and obstructed
house drains, decaying and
putrescent matter, both animal and
vegetable, and unventilated, damp,
crowded dwellings. Suggestions for
house cleaning, such as the use of
quick lime, coal tar, carbolic acid,
and white wash were circulated. For
privies, specific formulas for
disinfection, using eight to ten
pounds of sulphate of iron in five to
six gallons of water, in combination
with a pint of carbolic acid were
also published. [33] As a personal
hygienic advisory, the Daily Gazette
suggested temperance, pure
drinking water, fresh and
substantial food, rest, and bathing
as cholera preventatives. [34]
The Daily Gazette also
warned that “to conceal the fact of
the presence of cholera is criminal”
and that although the ”truth has
cost businessmen of this city some
money, it has saved the lives of
many of our citizens.” [35] In the
midst of the epidemic, the paper
also argued for the immediate
connection of the city's sewers as a
step towards improving the city’s
public health. However, the Gazette
further explained the reason for the
haphazard sewage system as being
“not the policy in Cincinnati,
because the city is not well
regulated.” [36] The press also used
its pages to remind the public of
particular problem areas, such as
the open spring on Lock Street,
between Sixth and Eighth Streets.
Here in this densely packed and
insalubrious section of the city was
a neighborhood where the cholera
epidemic of 1866 was ultimately
traced. [37]
The general state of
Cincinnati's housing in 1870 was
regarded as deplorable. To further
complicate the issue, the city was
known as the most densely
populated in the country per square
mile. Cincinnati had 1,410 tenement
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houses which were each home to six
or more families, and most of these
buildings were served by a single
privy. Forty per cent of these
families lived in one room, and
eighty­three per cent of these rooms
had but one window. [38] Under
these conditions, 5,000 privy vaults
were declared nuisances in 1873.
The possibilities for infection from
the ill contained and haphazard
disposal of human waste were
obvious. This reality was reflected
in the fact that 142 out of
Cincinnati's 207 cholera deaths, or
sixty­nine per cent occurred in the
tenement setting with dubious
sanitary amenities, while only 22
deaths or 11% were recorded in the
city's hospitals. [39]
In medical terms, the local
therapies for cholera's treatment in
1873 varied little in substance from
those used in earlier epidemics.
Although prescriptive dosages
changed over time, a
combination of emetics,
narcotics, poisons, and
anti­spasmodals were
employed. Doctors
continued to proclaim
their successes, on a
case by case basis, in
the many of the medical
journals of the period.
[40] The substances
most often mentioned
included: ipecac, aconite, sinapism,
morphia, quinine, camphor,
calomel, atrophia, and bismuth. [41]
The serious problem of dehydration
in cholera cases was generally not
medically addressed; however, the
1873 epidemic did witness a rise in
the use of the hypodermic syringe
as a delivery agent for prescribed
medicine. Besides pharmaceuticals,
physical phenomena, such as
electricity, were sometimes put
forth as cholera cures. As often was
the case in the past, cholera victims
had to contend for survival not only
with the ravages of the disease, but
also with the ministrations of the
doctors. Although the miasma
etiology was steadily losing ground
to the microscope and germ theory,
many doctors in 1873 still followed
the “bleed, purge, puke, and sweat”
treatment methodology.
Although the response to
the 1873 cholera outbreak may seem
poorly handled, as were the
responses to other water born
diseases such as typhoid, it did
produce some positive results as
seen in the increasing demand for
better public sanitation. When
translated into concrete political
action there were clear expansions
in the regulatory powers of
individual boards of health both
locally and nationally. Several years
before, in 1869, Massachusetts
established the initial pattern of
state health
coordination and
oversight. [42] In
April 1886 the Ohio
General Assembly
finally followed suit
and created the first
state board of health
with an annual
appropriation of
$5,000. In the
process Ohio
became the thirty­second state to
have such a body.
The importance of clean
water supply in the public health
arena was finally recognized in the
March 14, 1893 amendment to
Ohio’s 1886 board of health
legislation. Here it was stated that
“no city, village, corporation, or
person shall introduce a public
water supply or system of sewerage
or change or extend any public
water supply or outlet of any
system of sewerage now in use,
unless the proposed source of such
water supply or outlet for such
sewage system shall have been
submitted to and received the
approval of the state board of
health.” [43] From such concerns,
regulation of sewerage treatment
plants and garbage disposal
facilities soon followed.
Incorporated as part of the 1886
state board of health legislation was
also the realization that an accurate
state­wide system of collection,
tabulation, analysis, and
interpretation of vital statistics was
necessary for establishing proper
planning and procedures in public
health policies.
Circumstances in the
nineteenth century allowed for too
much local variance, and thus
contributed to an uncoordinated
approach to crises caused by
epidemic diseases. Even though this
piece of legislation saw an early
need for comprehensive health data
collection, a completely satisfactory
system of vital statistics
procurement did not materialize
until passage of the Ohio Vital
Statistics Law of 1908. [44] It can be
argued that, in general, cholera
epidemics and their destructive
impacts on local communities
provided a critical initial
mechanism for the regulatory
trends later seen in the Progressive
era’s early twentieth century search
for order.
Cholera's grim and deadly
arrival helped communities begin to
examine their social fabric. The
lessons learned concerning the
relationship of disease to
impoverished urban conditions
though were not totally understood
and acted upon until the twentieth
century. Nevertheless, in some
progressive medical and political
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quarters, cholera helped heighten
reform awareness. In time, this
association would be of tremendous
benefit in later twentieth century
struggles against other serious
diseases such as tuberculosis,
whose infectious rates increased in
similarly unhealthy social
circumstances. Here, as with the
battle against cholera, the great
bacteriologist Dr. Robert Koch
would play an instrumental role.
His discovery of the tubercle bacillus
in 1882 helped set the stage for
containing tuberculosis in the
twentieth century. [45] Although
great victories have been made in
the battles against infectious
diseases, such diseases remain
leading causes of death worldwide.
In the United States infectious
diseases such as HIV, pneumonia,
and influenza still appear in the top
ten list of killer afflictions and,
although advanced water and
sanitation treatments have offered
control, cholera continues to exist
and remains a serious threat to life
if untreated. [46]
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Dengue in Durban, 1927:
The Making of a Public Health Crisis
Philip D. RotzBoston University Graduate School of Arts & Sciences
n New Year’s Day 1927,the editorial page inDurban’s leadingnewspaper, warned of anepidemic in progress: “For weeks,for months past, it has gained inseriousness” and “will doubtlessrage furiously throughout theholidays.” [1] Since the beginningof the Christmas season, more than6,300 holidaymakers disembarkedfrom trains from the interior,alighting in the seaside townmunicipal boosters touted as “theBrighton of South Africa.” [2] TheNatal Mercury’s editorial writersconfessed: “Our visitors ought tohave been warned,” but “even thePress, who talked loudly about thesmallpox, have been silentregarding the Charleston epidemic”— “wherever two or three and agramophone are gathered togetherthe disease may be seen in its mostvirulent form.” [3]
The metaphor of epidemicillness was ripe for use in Durban,where the threat of widespreaddisease was a very recent memory.Beginning in mid­October 1926, thediscovery of seven cases offrequently fatal smallpox — amongthe most feared crowd diseasesfrom Europe — plunged residentsand municipal authorities into aneight­week public health crisis.Aggressive measures stamped outthe smallpox threat beforeChristmas, but not before “some 60cases” and 15 deaths occurred —almost exclusively among thetown’s Indian residents. [4] Oncesubdued, health authorities shiftedfrom protecting the public toprotecting pockets, issuingstatements that Durban was safe fortravelers seeking sun and sea —and their coveted pounds andshillings. Puckishly framing thepopularity of the Charleston in the
language of a public health crisiscalled to mind the 13 smallpox­related editorials that recentlyappeared in the same space. [5]Perhaps readers shook their heads,chuckled quietly, or exhaled withrelief at the comparative lightness ofthis affliction. An epidemic hadbeen averted, no ‘Europeans’contracted smallpox, and theholiday season’s merrymaking andmoneymaking were in full swing.But while Durbanites andholidaymakers danced, anotherepidemic was beginning to mass.As the calendar turned over,dengue fever took hold in thewarm, moist coastal plain in andaround Durban. A tropical diseaseconsidered temporarily debilitating,but not deadly, dengue infections atfirst went unnoticed, thenunremarked, but nevertheless builtto epidemic scale. Amid thesummer of 1927’s heavy rains and
O
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high heat, residents struggled tocontrol the aedes egypti mosquitosthat transmit dengue. Only in lateMay, after the arrival of wintertemperatures, did the epidemicsubside. Summary reportsindicated that dengue “affected anarea extending about 40 miles fromDurban,” rattled the local economy,and resulted in “about 50,000”estimated cases and 61 directlyattributable deaths. [6] In contrast tothe smallpox outbreak, the dengueepidemic disproportionatelyaffected the town’s white residents.Reports observed that “nearly halfof the European population ofDurban was infected,” whiledengue cases in the Indian andAfrican communities wereestimated among “only about one­tenth of their number.” [7] Exactlyfive months after making light of“The Charleston Epidemic,” thesame editorial page offered neithermirth nor metaphor: “the twoepidemics of the past twelvemonths have given it [Durban] asomewhat rude shock.” [8]One town. Eight months.Two very different diseases. Twomarkedly disproportionate burdensof disease. Two primarily affectedcommunities with unequal standingin the race­stratified society of earlytwentieth century South Africa.And one question: what makes apublic health crisis? Smallpox wasone. Dengue became one. Howand why, in 1927, was denguerecognized as a serious threat andmade a notifiable disease? Basedprimarily on review of the dailyeditions of the The Natal Mercury(hereafter Mercury), I argue that theepidemic’s scale, human suffering,and the public clamor of whitecitizens, contributed to thereconsideration of dengue.However, pressures grounded inshort­term economic losses andDurban’s longer­term industrialaspirations were the leadingreasons why health authoritiesabandoned a laissez­faire, let­it­run­its­course stance and recognizeddengue as a public health crisis.
Durban in 1927
In 1927 Durban occupied alocation just west of the IndianOcean’s sand rimmed shoreline and
north of the town’s prized harbor(Figure 1). This location — betweenbeach and bay — contributed toseveral overlapping municipalidentities: recreation ground,transportation hub, and fledglingindustrial site. Located on theprovince of Natal’s subtropicalcoastal plain, Durban enjoyed longsummers and short, mild winters.The town’s favorable climate, warmwaters, broad beaches, and horseracing venues made it a popularholiday destination for whites fromSouth Africa’s interior during theChristmas season, Easter break, andthe southern hemisphere’s June­to­August winters. [9]From the Borough ofDurban’s founding in 1854, thetown’s fortunes were staked on itsprotected harbor and its capacity towelcome shipping. Durban waswell situated along establishedtrade routes. On South Africa’seastern coast, the town wasfavorably positioned for trade withthe Indian subcontinent, sea trafficcircling Africa via the Suez Canal,and European vessels roundingSouth Africa bound for Australia,for which the Suez route providedno advantage. [10] With coalarriving by rail from Zululand,Durban’s harbor was an essentialre­coaling stop during the age ofsteamships. By 1927, the railwaythat wended its way up over theescarpment hadbolstered Durban’ssignificance as atransport hub for threedecades, connectingthe town’s docks to thelucrative mines andburgeoning city ofJohannesburg locatedmore than 500 kminland. Durban had long been acollection point and processingcenter for agriculture productsgrown on Natal’s subtropical coast,especially sugar. [11] But during theFirst World War, furtherindustrialization began to occur,although the manufacturing sectorremained small. [12] While townleaders anxiously desired moreindustry — and offered a superiorport and competitive water andelectricity rates — someindustrialists chose other locations
because land within the Boroughwas scarce and expensive andmunicipal rates were high. [13] In1927, Durban’s standing as anindustrial center in its own rightremained more aspiration thanrealization.Populated by 123,000people, the Borough was denselysettled, hemmed­in by several ofnatural features: the ocean to theeast, the top of the Berea Ridge tothe west, the Umgeni River to thenorth, and the harbor and UmbiloRiver to the south (Figure 1). Threeprimary groups of people madetheir home within the confines ofthe Borough in 1927: ‘Europeans’(59,600), Indians (21,286), andAfricans (42,100). The majority of‘Europeans’ were of Englishbackground — although theincreasing presence of ‘poor whites’was anxiously noted. Many livedon the sea­facing side of the BereaRidge or other elevated slopes. [14]The Indian community centered onthe flat land near Grey Street, on thewestern margins of the town center.[15] ‘Barracks’ near the UmgeniRiver, to the north, were home tomany former indentured Indianlaborers. Africans living in theBorough were mostly male workersengaged in casual labor, laundrybusinesses, rickshaw running, andcontract work. [16]Another 100,000 peoplelived in the sevenperi­urban areasalong the Borough’sboundaries. [17]While the DurbanTown Council and itsmunicipal healthdepartment operatedwithin the Borough,the greater Durbanarea and the population centers onthe coastal plain to the town’s northand south were administered by apatchwork of administrativejurisdictions. In each of the sevenperi­urban districts, Boards of LocalAdministration and Public Healthwere the responsible entities. The‘native reserves,’ home to a largeportion of Africans in the province,were under the administration ofthe Native Affairs Department andin some settings includedmissionary medical presence.Finally, since the governance
The town’s favorableclimate, warm waters,broad beaches, andhorse racing venuesmade it a popularholiday destinationfor whites from SouthAfrica’s interior.
structure for the Union of SouthAfrica did not include theestablishment of provincial healthauthorities, the national UnionHealth Department was responsiblefor the province’s rural areas.
Crisis vs. Nuisance
Based on its long history ofdevastation in Europe and periodicepidemics in South Africa,beginning in the 1700s, smallpox —contagious, spread from person­to­person, and potentially fatal — wasa public health crisis on day one.[18] The disease had no cure, spreadprimarily through the exhalations ofsymptomatic sufferers, and killed toup to 30% of people infected. [19]Smallpox was an illness to beprevented, monitored, andaggressively combated. [20]The tactics and tools toprevent and fight smallpox werewell established and had the force
of law: compulsory notification ofany suspicious cases, isolation ofinfected persons, tracing of allcontacts, medical observation orquarantine, and vaccination of allinfants before 13 months, childrenand adults every five years, andunvaccinated persons in andaround a confirmed outbreak. [21]In mid­October 1926, it was thenotification of a possible case ofsmallpox that prompted staff fromDurban’s municipal HealthDepartment to visit the IndianBarracks at Umgeni — whereroughly 600 people resided in closequarters. [22] To their dismay, theydiscovered “seven definite cases.”[23] Six Indian residents and oneAfrican were ill and had beensymptomatic and infectious for atleast a week. [24] The subtitles inThe Natal Mercury told the story: “illfor at least a week; police guard onIndian barracks; danger of futurespread.” [25] Isolation, contact
tracing, quarantine, and vaccinationbegan that day and continued untilthe last case cleared eight weekslater. The threat of smallpox putthe machinery of crisis quickly intomotion. In contrast, despiteepisodes of dengue­like illness in1896, 1902, 1914, and late theprevious summer, when denguefever appeared in and aroundDurban it went unremarked in theMercury for seven weeks. [26] In aninterview in late January 1927, Dr.Park Ross, of the Union HealthDepartment, noted “a considerableamount of dengue,” seemingly todispel worries that recent increasesin the incidence of fever indicated agathering epidemic of influenza.[27] The news that influenza caseswere few and mild was a significantassurance less than a decade afterthe 1918 influenza pandemicclaimed 300,000 lives in SouthAfrica. [28] Untroubled by thepresence of dengue, Ross revealedthat cases had been reported in thearea before Christmas, and localized“epidemics” had occurred in threecommunities outside Durban, eachlocated along a different train lineleaving the Borough. [29] Theprimary message from healthauthorities was emphasized with alarge subtitle: “No Cause forAlarm.” [30] In early 1927, denguewas a nuisance, not a threat.There are several reasonswhy health officials in Durban didnot initially consider dengue “causefor alarm.” Most significantly — atthe individual level — althoughsome sufferers experienced “severeprostration and debility,” denguewas “seldom fatal.” [31] In the earlytwentieth century, most dengueinfections took one of two forms:either a mild, nonspecific febrileillness often indistinguishable fromother fevers, or the more severe‘classical dengue.’ [32] The moresevere form, which occurred lessfrequently, earned the disease thename “break­bone fever” for itsintense eye­socket, muscle, bone,and joint pain. [33] Vomiting,swollen lymph glands, and rashwere also common and, like thefever, usually resolved within aweek. [34] Full convalescence couldtake “three to four weeks” and was
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FIGURE 1: MAP of DURBAN from around 1930. The darkened space is theBorough of Durban. The surrounding areas are the peri­urban districts
marked by recurrent aches, generalweakness, and suppressed appetite.[35] A large dengue epidemic couldcripple a city — but widespreaddeath was not found in its wake.[36] The second and thirdreasons dengue was not considereda high­level threat are found at thepopulation level and have to dowith the severity and frequency ofepidemic dengue. Past dengueepidemics in Durban do not appearto have risen to the level of crisis. In1927, none of the specific referencesin the Mercury to the1914 dengueepidemic call it acrisis, or spare ink todescribe its toll. [37]Moreover, journalistsand letter writerssupplying examplesof severe mosquito­borne disease recalled the 1905malaria epidemic rather than thelast visitation of dengue. The issueof frequency also lowered thepriority level for dengue. Sincepeople infected by the dengue viruswere generally immune to futureattacks, epidemics usually occurredat irregular intervals of a decade ormore in non­endemic areas. [38]Because dengue was “seldom fatal,”had not previously crippled themunicipality, and occurredinfrequently, Durban’s healthauthorities approached the 1927dengue epidemic as something tobe endured while it ran its course,rather than an episode thatdemanded aggressive municipalaction. There is one more crucialconsideration: the mosquito. Threethings must be present to transmitdengue: the introduction of thevirus, usually through the presenceof a person with an active infection;susceptible human hosts; and thefemale aedes egypti mosquitos thattransmit the virus. [39] Unlikediseases spread person­to­person,like smallpox, a mosquito cannot besubjected to social control measures,nor interviewed for a list of contactsof every person it has bitten.The aedes egypti mosquito is“highly adapted to humans andurban environments.” [40] Thespecies lives in or very near humandwellings; travels only short
distances; prefers to feed on people;and seeks bloodmeals just afterdaybreak and again in the earlyevening hours, when people areactive in and around their homes.[41] Probably to increase its chancesof survival this particular mosquitois easily disrupted when taking ablood meal. [42] This “interruptedfeeding” means that the samemosquito may bite several people insuccession to complete its meal —increasing the opportunities forviral transmission, perhaps tomultiple people in the same room.[43] Female aedes egyptimosquitos deposit theireggs — around 100 at atime — in containerscommon to manyhouses and yards:barrels, drums, gutters,buckets, pots, flowervases, plant saucers,old tires, and discarded bottles andtins, as well as treeholes and watercollection points formed by thenotches of other plants around thehome. [44] In this way, denguepresented a more complex andprotracted challenge than smallpox.While smallpox requiredmotivating single acts ofsubmission to vaccination — withthe backing of constable and judge,if necessary — facing down thefecundity and appetite of aedesegypti required a whole season ofvigilance on the part of individualsand community. Yet, when dengueappeared in Durban, the home­dwelling nature of the vectormosquito contributed to the Durbanhealth authorities’ laissez­faireapproach to the epidemic. Whilemunicipal work crews treatedswampy areas with oil to preventthe anopheles mosquitos associatedwith malaria, the fight against aedesegypti in houses and yards wasframed as the responsibility ofindividual ‘householders.’ [45]
Emerging Crisis
Despite Dr. Park Ross’sJanuary assurance that dengue was“no cause for alarm,” infectionscontinued to rise. On February 19,the Mercury described dengue as“epidemic” in the borough, but thenumber of cases could only bereported as “numerous” because it
was not a notifiable disease. [46]That summer, the remarkablespread of dengue was likelyspurred by heavy rains in Februaryand March that kept breedinglocations filled with water, and highsummer temperatures (particularlydays over 30°C) that likelyquickened the egg­larva­pupastages of the species’ lifecycle. [47]Those same high temperaturesprobably also contributed todengue’s spread in at least oneother way, by shortening the lengthof the virus’s incubation periodwithin each mosquito — providingmore opportunity for aedes egypti tospread the virus throughbloodmeals. [48]During February the pair ofMercury articles about the dengueepidemic were focused oninforming the public and conveyedthree messages: dengue wasprevalent in the Borough, aedesegypti mosquitos spread the disease,and householders should employedanti­mosquito measures to curb theepidemic. [49] This advice includedroutinely inspecting the house andyard for breeding sites andemptying any water and coveringwater storage with a dense screen orapplying a layer of oil or kerosenethat would sit atop the water tokeep mosquito larva from gettingoxygen. [50] Advertisements in thenewspaper reflected the growingpresence of dengue in Durban.Print ads for household insecticidesbegan to vie for customersdesperate to rid their homes ofmosquitos (Figures 2 & 3) and acoastal resort to the southspecifically targeted denguesufferers, promising a location inwhich they could recuperate with“every comfort and attention.” [51]By the middle of March, anestimate of 5,000 dengue cases inthe Borough was floated in thepress and an open letter addressedto “Mr. and Mrs. Householder”from “A Victim” pointedly scoldedhome­dwellers for lax mosquitocontrol on their properties, echoingthe health authorities’ stance thatthe fight against aedes egypti was amatter of individual initiative andrecognizance. [52] However, whenthe first of nine dengue­relatededitorials in the Mercury ran thenext day, the newspaper reached43Aceso
Reports filed afterthe epidemic estimatedthat nearly one intwo ‘Europeans’ hadcontracted dengue,while perhaps onein ten Indians andAfricans became ill.
beyond the personal responsibilitynarrative, obliquely criticizing themunicipality by ruing the“tendency in Durban” to viewdengue “from a sort of fatalist pointof view, as a seasonal fever which, ifthe town is lucky, will cause littleserious illness and will in any eventsoon be over.” [53]The same editorial struckon the crux of the crisis­nuisanceissue, what might be called, ‘thedengue paradox’: “the reallyunfortunate thing about dengue isthat its effects are neither dangerousenough to make it an alarmingdisease or mild enough to allowanybody to treat it withindifference.” [54] Hereafter,increased editorial pressure fell onthe municipality, as the publicconversation widened to includemore than the personal andneighborly responsibilities ofhouseholders. From mid­Marchthrough May the Mercury criticizedthe municipal Health Departmentfor inactivity and ineffectiveness.Just before April, municipal healthauthorities announced policychanges that included a promise tomake dengue a notifiable illnessbefore next summer, the training ofschoolchildren to carry out anti­mosquito measures, and thepreparation of a comprehensiveprevention plan for the followingyear. [55] But before this change inpublic stance one insecticide brandmoved to capitalize on the publicdissatisfaction with the healthdepartment’s passivity, cleverlylaced their ads with a tagline thatwarned, “do not wait for theauthorities to take action” (Figure4). [56] The re­making of dengueinto a public health crisis wasunderway.
Making a Public Health Crisis
A constellation of factorsmade dengue a public health crisisin 1927. The most visible ones werethe epidemic’s scale and suffering.By the beginning of May, themunicipal health departmentestimated that 30,000 cases hadoccurred within its borders. [57] ByJune, the Mercury editors believedthe true figure was “considerablyhigher.” [58] Even unadjusted, thisstatistic represents a staggering
burden of disease, affecting one infour residents in a borough home to123,000 people. [59] A report in thatran in the Journal of the South AfricanMedical Association that yearclaimed 40,000 cases as aconservative figure for the town ofDurban and surrounding areas, and
a subsequent international diseasesurveillance report fixed theestimated cases on the Natal coastalplain at about 50,000. [60] These areenormous numbers.Behind these estimateswere the experiences ofcommunities like Putnam’s Hill,that reported on March 1st: “Theepidemic still seems to be raging inthe district” and “is visiting everyhome in turn.” [61] The followingmonth, Durban’s leading Anglican,Archdeacon Heywood­Harris spokesimilarly about the town,
remarking, “I doubt if there aremany families in the borough thathave entirely escaped.” [62] Inmany homes — where the battlewith aedes egypti over flesh andblood played out — the experienceof a newspaper contributor,“Mother,” could hardly have beenunique: “at our house, we are in thethroes of dengue: the son of thehouse, the cook of the house, and avisitor all laid low." [63] For many,the home was not only a key site ofinfection and affliction, but also asite of failure, frustration, andblame. The lament of onehouseholder was probably widelyechoed: “I have used KOMO [abrand name insecticide] galore, andin spite of this, one by one, we havegone down with it (five up todate).” [64] The scale of the 1927dengue epidemic helped make it apublic health crisis.The municipal healthdepartment claimed “the vastmajority of cases” were mildenough that “confinement to bedwas not necessary for more thantwo or three days” and only “asmall percentage” were severe. [65]If just 10% of estimated infectionswere severe, then 4,000­5,000 peopleon the Natal coast met withconsiderable suffering. Onesubmission published in theMercury in April, employed adescriptive literary approach todescribing infection, usingpersonification to convey theexperience of severe dengue:
A skinny hand grips you at the back of theneck. Slowly the fingers press themselvesinto your cranium. Fire seems to burst fromevery fingertip. Suddenly, as though bylightning flash, they shoot and dance somedemonical dance along your spine. The iceand flame antagonize each other in yourback. In the darkness that has fallen youstruggle to retain your backbone. It is of noavail. The bone, which has been your chiefstay in life, crumbles and refuses tomaintain you, even in a recumbent position.[66]
While tending toward melodrama,this description corresponds to thereport of one Durban doctor thatpatients tearfully told him they feltlike they were being thrashed. [67]Under these circumstances,boarding house keepers were44Aceso
FIGURE 2: KOMO Ad,February 21, 1927.
FIGURE 3: BALA Ad,February 24, 1927.
criticized for leaving sufferers alone“for days without receivingattention” and the archdeaconobserved that dengue“overburdened people withdomestic duties in ministering tothe sick.” [68] Despite lowmortality, the visibility of pain anddebility called into question the‘dengue paradox’ and contributedto the epidemic’s recognition as acrisis. The specific populationmost afflicted during the 1927epidemic also contributed to theelevation of dengue to a publichealth crisis. Most dengue­sufferers
were white. Reports filed after theepidemic estimated that nearly onein two ‘Europeans’ had contracteddengue, while perhaps one in tenIndians and Africans became ill.[69] The reported distribution ofdisease is notable. And a bitpuzzling. [70] In tropical locationswhere dengue is endemic adiscrepancy of this type betweennewer European arrivals andnative­born residents could beexplained as the result of immunitylocal residents acquired fromchildhood infections. [71] Butdengue was not endemic in Durban,and there is little reason to believethat significantly more Africansthan whites acquired immunityduring the considerably smallerdengue outbreaks in 1926, 1914, and1902. On the other hand, acquiredimmunity may have limited
application to the lower incidenceof disease observed among Indians.Dengue was endemic in many citieson the Indian subcontinent, so someIndians probably arrived in SouthAfrica with hard­won immunity todengue. But this explanation canonly partially account for thedifferences noted in Durban,because, by the 1920s, two­thirds ofIndians in Natal were born in SouthAfrica. [72] Since the most obviousbiological factors seem unlikely toaccount for the skewed distributionof disease, the reasons may lieelsewhere and invite furtherinvestigation.The finding that whiteswere disproportionately affected bythe epidemic corresponds to mostmentions of the race of denguesufferers in the Mercury. Further,discussion of the epidemic is largelyabsent from the Zulu newspaperIlanga lase Natal and the Indianweekly Indian Opinion. [73] Mercuryreports from neighborhoods orsurrounding villages includedcomments like “quite a number ofwell­known residents are downwith the complaint” (Sea View),“nearly the whole of the whitepopulation has been affected”(Tongaat), or “fresh cases areoccurring chiefly among Europeans(Berea).” [74] The first insecticideadvertisement that explicitlymentioned dengue to sell itsproduct noted that “400 of 2,000electors” in one constituency —electors being white property­owners — did not vote in a recentelection “owing to the epidemic ofDengue Fever.” [75] Because whiteDurbanites were so heavilyaffected, the pronouncements anddebates in the Mercury were notabout others and the perceived‘other,’ but were engaged by thepopulation suffering most from thedisease. This differed markedlyfrom the smallpox outbreak in late1926, in which nearly all suffererswere from the Indian community,but only a few well­off Indianvoices could be found in thepublication. If dengue haddisproportionately affectedDurban’s Indian community, onewonders if the public discoursearound the epidemic would haveconnected mosquito­borne illness to
the racial stereotypes of Indians’unsanitary habits and livingconditions commonly invokedduring the smallpox outbreak,rather than the neighborlyindividual responsibilities of(white) middle­class“householders.” As it was, a whitepopulation well­positionedpolitically and practiced inchanneling dissatisfaction throughthe public medium of newspapers,probably contributed to the HealthDepartment’s reversal on theepidemic.Ultimately though, despitethe merits of scale and suffering andthe clamor from white readership,the most significant factors indengue’s establishment as a publichealth crisis in 1927 appear to havebeen economic. When the Mercury’seditorial page first decried thehealth department’s “fatalist pointof view” and willingness to let theepidemic run its course, theargument was not laid onhumanitarian grounds. Instead, theepidemic’s “economic effects” werecited as “serious enough to call for awhole­hearted effort to clear theDurban area of the mosquitomenace, and keep it clear.” [76] TheMercury editors pasted into theircolumn a paragraph from theirsister paper, The Advertiser,unabashedly framed in marketlogic:
At the very lowest estimate, five thousandwage earners in this small town have beenout of commission for about a week. Inother words, five thousand weeks ofproductive effort have been directly lost tothe town. In addition, there is to becalculated the impaired vitality duringconvalescence, the disorganization ofwarehouse, shop and office owing todepleted staffs, and the diversion of financesto doctors and chemists that wouldotherwise be in circulation in lesslugubrious channels. The stupid economicwaste of dengue can be chronicled in suchterms as ought to make a really live businesscommunity declare it would never allow arepetition of the thing. [77]
Here the symptom­oriented‘dengue paradox’ — neitherdangerous enough to alarm, normild enough to ignore — was rolledaway in favor of an unequivocal
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FIGURE 4: KOMO Ad, March 26, 1927 –“Do Not Wait for the Authoritiesto take Action.”
argument against “the stupideconomic waste of dengue.” Withina week the same space called on theChambers of Commerce andIndustries to pressure themunicipality toward action. [78]When the Chamber ofCommerce held their annualmeeting the following month, theassociation did not explicitlyaddress municipal initiative. But,its president, Mr. Gundelfinger, diddecry the epidemic’s impact onbusiness in the town. He estimatedthat “the direct loss to workersthrough lost time, and to employersthrough lost services, must run wellinto six figures when expressed insterling” and “at least 60 percent ofthose employed in what aresometimes officially described as‘gainful occupations’” had takensick leave. [79] Bodies and businesswere battered by the epidemic.And the bodies affected were notonly those at the low end of thewage scale. By late May, as coolertemperatures arrived and the 1927epidemic began to ebb, a delegationfrom the Chambers of Commerceand Industries, the Master Builders’Association, and the Retailers’Council met with the Town Councilto brief them on the economiceffects of the smallpox and dengueoutbreaks. [80] The town’s businessrepresentatives insistedthat the municipalitymove aggressively to‘disease­proof’ Durban,and pledge theirsupport for thisagenda. [81] Thenuisance was nowclearly considered athreat — one thatdemanded proactiveprevention.But near­term‘economic waste’ wasnot the mortar that bound togetherthe town’s political establishment,boosters, newspaper editors, andlocal capital. Dengue threatenedthe vision these constituenciesshared of Durban’s industrialfuture. In the late 1920s, that visioninvolved an overt pivot from beachto bay and the belief that “theultimate destiny of Port Natal lies inits steady expansion into theindustrial metropolis of SouthAfrica.” [82] A town made a down
payment on that destiny throughinvestments in land reclamationaround the harbor, a new gravingdock, grain elevators, and coalequipment, increased capacity forelectricity production, and a newwater scheme that would soonprovide ample water for industries.[83] This path to primacy andprosperity could not be endangeredby house­dwelling mosquitos.In its editorial barrageagainst the health department inlate March and April, the Mercurywriters made clear that the mostsignificant trouble with dengue wasthat it threatened Durban’s long­term prospects.
What hope will Durban have of establishingitself as the great industrial center of theUnion if the vitality and productiveefficiency of all classes of workers in thetown and district are constantly sapped byannually recurrent epidemics of denguefever? Will not manufacturers fight shy ofthe place? [84]
This concern makes plain thataspirations for an industrial futurewere the most significant factor inthe reconsideration of dengue as apublic health crisis. [85] Layingclaim to that industrial destinyalready required shaking off‘conventional wisdom’ about thetropical worker and theinfluence ofenvironment. Theadded burden andstigma of mosquito­borne tropical diseasecould not becountenanced.
The thought has beenadvanced from elsewherethat the heat of the Durbansummer reduces the capacityof its workers during thatperiod. This is to be doubted, but it is not tobe doubted that an annual dengue epidemicin conjunction with the summer heatundoubtedly would have that effect, and ifthis epidemic becomes a permanent featureof the Durban year it will prove a veryserious handicap in our competition withother towns for trade and industry. [86]
Here lies the most significant reasonwhy sustained pressure wasapplied to make dengue a publichealth crisis. Lives can be
threatened. Suffering can occur.Influential communities can raisehell. Money and man­hours can belost. But the future must bedefended — particularly if profitsmight be made there.
Conclusion
When dengue fever struckDurban during the first months of1927, it was considered “no causefor alarm.” A nuisance, not a crisis.The disease’s low case mortality, thelimited size of previous dengueoutbreaks, the irregular andinfrequent timing of epidemics, andthe virus’s transmission by a home­dwelling mosquito species, ledmunicipal health authorities toinitially adopt a laissez­faireapproach. This stood in starkcontrast to the level of mobilizationthat accompanied the smallpoxoutbreak only a few months before.During the critical weekswhen the epidemic was buildingand mosquito densities wererapidly increasing, the ActingMedical Officer of Health lecturedhouseholders through the pressabout their personal responsibilityto eliminate aedes egypti breedingsites, but did not organize orpromote a broader program ofinspections. This posture laterchanged, under escalating publicpressure and calls for the HealthDepartment to treat dengue as apublic health crisis.When the last dengue caseswere tallied, authorities estimatedthat 50,000 people had sufferedfrom the disease in and aroundDurban. But the sheer scale of theepidemic was one of a constellationof contributing factors thatdemonstrated that dengue shouldbe engaged as a threat. Theassociated human suffering andpublic clamor from thedisproportionately affected whitecommunity were also influential.In a constellation, not allstars are equal. Economic concernswere foremost in assembling acoalition of boosters, localpoliticians, commerce, and industrythat, in May, demanded the“disease­proofing” of Durban andjoined with the Town Council toaffirm, “Good Public Health meansGood Business.” [87] But — at a46Aceso
Despite the meritsof scale and sufferingand the clamor fromwhite readership, themost significantfactors in dengue’sestablishment as apublic health crisisin 1927 appear tohave been economic.
time when Durban was shifting itssights from holiday resort toindustrial port — the North Starthat guided the drive to preventfuture dengue outbreaks was thedream of a prosperous industrialfuture. A vision jeopardized byepidemic tropical disease and theconfounding mosquitos that spreadit. Dengue became a public healthcrisis because “safeguard[ing] thegreat future of the borough is theparamount task of the HealthDepartment.” [88]The enthusiasm for disease­proofing that resulted from thisepisode in Durban’s history fallssquarely along the route to theDurban Borough BoundariesCommission, the extension of themunicipality’s control over theseven surrounding peri­urban areasa few years later, attempts to applythe 1923 Native Urban Areas Act tothose newly added spaces, and theforced removals and modernistplanning effected at the industrialsite at the head of the bay.But on June 1, all that lay inthe future. That day the Mercurylamented, “one of the lesser, thoughurgent problems of the moment isthat of convincing South Africa thatthe dengue epidemic is at an end.”[89] Durban was still a town by thesea and crowds of seasonal refugeesfleeing the cold Highveld winterwere expected to soon alight at thecentral train station. There wasmerrymaking and moneymaking tolook after. And perhaps — if thegramophone still worked — a littleCharleston.
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can be considered the first descriptionof the 1927 epidemic in the Mercury.However, on January 11, an item rannoting that East London officials,finding 15 crew members with dengue,quarantined the S.S. Jagersfontein —which left Durban on January 9th.These infections were attributed toMombasa, “where the vessel calledrecently.” However, the Kenya Gazetteindicates the steamer left Kilindi Harboron December 1. While six weeks andseveral shipboard transmission cyclesare possible, it seems at least as likely —given that dengue’s intrinsic incubationperiod averages 4­7 days, the ship’sarrival in Durban on January 4, and the(then unremarked) presence of denguein the town — that the infectionsdiscovered at East London occurred inDurban. Disease Aboard Ship: FeverContacted on East African Coast. TheNatal Mercury. January 11, 1927. Also,Shipping Report: Kilindi Harbour. TheKenya Gazette. December 22, 1926; 28:1533.[30] Influenza or Dengue Fever?:Durban Public Confused. The NatalMercury. January 29, 1927.[31] Reid, 308.[32] Gubler, Dengue, 229.[33] Ibid.[34] Humphreys M. Dengue Fever:Breakbone Fever. In: Kiple KF, ed. Pox,Plagues, and Pestilence: Disease in History.London: Orion Publishing Group; 1999,page 92.[35] Edington, 447.[36] Consider the case mortality rates inthe two examples in this essay. The 15deaths among 60 reported cases ofsmallpox in 1926 represented a ‘kill rate’of 25%. The 61 deaths attributed to theestimated 50,000 cases of dengueyielded a case mortality rate of 0.1%.[37] For example, Another DengueEpidemic: Numerous Cases in theBorough, The Natal Mercury. February19, 1927.[38] Reid, 308. This statement cannot,however, be applied to contemporarydengue dynamics and since immunityis subtype specific and the disease’sfour subtypes overlap much morecommonly.[39] Gubler, Dengue, 236.[40] Gubler D. Dengue/DengueHemorrhagic Fever: History andCurrent Status. In: Novartis FoundationSymposium 277: New Treatment Strategiesfor Dengue and Other Flaviviral Diseases.Chichester, UK: John Wiley & Sons, Ltd;2006: 3­16. Page 4.
[41] Gubler, Dengue, 242­245.[42] Ibid., 245.[43] Ibid.[44] Gubler, Dengue, 244. Also,Dengue/DHF: Frequently AskedQuestions. World Health Organization,2006. Available at:http://www.searo.who.int/en/section10/section332/section1026.htm.Accessed April 24, 2012.[45] Another Dengue Epidemic:Numerous Cases in the Borough. TheNatal Mercury. Feb 19, 1927.[46] Ibid.[47] Natal Rainfall: Returns for March.The Natal Mercury. April 14, 1927. Fortemperature’s effect on extrinsicincubation periods, see Gubler, Dengue,243.[48] Gubler, Dengue, 243.[49] Another Dengue Epidemic. TheNatal Mercury. February 19, 1927. AlsoThe Dengue Fever Outbreak, The NatalMercury. February 26, 1927.[50] Ibid.[51] The first ad, for the insecticideKOMO, ran in The Natal Mercury onFebruary 21. This was followed shortlyby two ads that today would be called‘advertorials’ for the insecticideBALALA, on February 23 and 24. OnMarch 1, an ad for the Beach HotelUmgababa appeared.[52] Dangers of Dengue Fever. The NatalMercury. March 11, 1927. The estimateof 5000 case also appeared on March 11,in the Mercury’s sister paper, the NatalAdvertiser. The figure was reprinted inthe Mercury’s lead editorial on March12.[53] Stamp It Out. The Natal Mercury.March 12, 1927.[54] Ibid.[55] War at Last. The Natal Mercury.March 29, 1927.[56] Komo Ad. The Natal Mercury.March 26, 1927.[57] Dengue Position. The NatalMercury. May 4, 1927.[58] A Great Opportunity. The NatalMercury. June 1, 1927.[59] The total population of the boroughis listed at 122,986 in a tablesummarizing data from the 1927­28,Durban Borough BoundariesCommission in Freund, 33.[60] Edington, 446. Also, Current WorldPrevalence of Communicable Diseases.Public Health Reports. October 26, 1928;43: 2829­2833.[61] Puntam’s Hill: Dengue Epidemic.The Natal Mercury. March 1, 1927.[62] Dengue Epidemic: Archdeacon and
the “Lesson.” The Natal Mercury. April7, 1927.[63] Our Dengue: A Durban HomeToday. The Natal Mercury. March 29,1927.[64] An Indignant Householder. TheNatal Mercury. March 19, 1927.[65] Dengue Position. The Natal Mercury.May 4, 1927.[66] Dengue: How it Happens. The NatalMercury. April 22, 1927.[67] Edington, 447.[68] Durban & Dengue Fever. The NatalMercury. March 17, 1927. Also, DengueEpidemic: Archdeacon and the“Lesson.” The Natal Mercury. April 7,1927.[69] Current World Prevalence ofCommunicable Diseases. Public HealthReports. October 26, 1928; 43: 2829­2833.[70] Interestingly, a sero­surveypublished in 1957 sketched whatarthropod­borne viruses had occurredin which places in South Africa over thelast 30­50 years. Dengue was amongthe viruses these researchers wereinterested in. The study protocolstipulated that participants could nothave traveled more than 30 miles fromtheir birthplace during their lifetime.While the race of the participants wasnot provided, the article noted that themobility of South African life meantthat most participants were Africanwomen. In Durban the researchersfound 30% of adults in a small sample(9/30) had antibodies to dengue.Kokernot RH, Smithburn KC, WeinbrenMP. Neutralising antibodies toarthropod­borne viruses in human andanimals in the Union of South Africa.Journal of Immunology. 1956; 77: 313­322.[71] Gubler, Dengue, 225.[72] According to 1921 census data,93,767 of the 141,336 Indians living inNatal were born in South Africa(66.3%). South African Indian CongressStatement: Submitted to theGovernment of India Delegation. IndianOpinion, January 7, 1927; 2: 1.[73] Review of Ilanga lase Natal fromJanuary 1 to June 30, 1927, yielded twopublic notices about the epidemicplaced by the Durban Town Clerk.Indian Opinion mentioned the denguesituation three times during the sameperiod by including short quotationslifted from Durban’s daily papers in the“Notes and News” section.[74] Influenza or Dengue Fever. TheNatal Mercury. January 29, 1927.Tongaat: General Items. The NatalMercury. Feb 10, 1927. Dengue FeverAceso 48
Aceso
Outbreak: Fresh Cases on the Berea. TheNatal Mercury. March 23, 1927.[75] KOMO Ad. The Natal Mercury.February 21, 1927.[76] Stamp It Out. The Natal Mercury.March 12, 1927.[77] Ibid.[78] Innocence – or What? The NatalMercury. March 17, 1927.[79] The Commercial Year. The NatalMercury. April 29, 1929.[80] Is Durban Disease Proof?: BusinessMen Tackle Council. The Natal Mercury.May 23, 1927.[81] Ibid.[82] This quote is taken from the 1926­27“Mayor’s Minute” and an annualstatement excerpted in this article: TheMetropolis of Industry in S.A.. The NatalMercury. July 28, 1927.[83] Ibid.[84] A Convert. The Natal Mercury.March 30, 1927.[85] Here, a curious irony is worthnoting. Despite the knowledge that anattack of dengue confers immunity, thelikelihood of recurrent epidemics isrepeatedly invoked. Counter argumentswere not made that one advantage of anepidemic of this size is that it wouldserve the same function as a massvaccination program. Significantlyreducing the number of susceptiblehuman hosts would limit chances, orsevere outbreaks in the near future.[86] Team Work Wanted. The NatalMercury. April 1, 1927[87] Good Business. The Natal Mercury.May 24, 1927.[88] This quote is an assertion made in aMercury editorial: A Convert. The NatalMercury. March 30, 1927.[89] A Great Opportunity. The NatalMercury. June 1, 1927.
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Dr. Garland and PlymouthHospital
Alison BarnetSouth End Historian
Medicine in Massachusetts
hen Dr. Cornelius
N. Garland arrived
in Boston in 1903,
having passed the
Massachusetts state boards with
high honors, he undoubtedly
expected to find professional
opportunities. He had graduated
from Leonard Medical School at
Shaw University in Raleigh, North
Carolina in 1897, one of several
Southern black medical schools that
instilled in their students a strong
sense of mission, and he had just
returned from doing postgraduate
work in operative surgery at
London University, specializing in
the diseases of women and children.
Boston was a small city
with a very small black population
and a great deal of prejudice.
Boston City Hospital, which had
proudly opened in 1864, didn’t
admit black doctors or nurses for
training. Whether the hospital
treated black patients is unclear.
Dr. Garland was born in
Alabama and “worked his way up
from humble beginnings,”
according to great­grandson Dan
Reppert of North Carolina. As a
young man at Shaw University,
Garland was a skilled athlete,
playing on the first black football
team; in his senior year he was
president of Shaw’s Athletic
Association.
During his first years in
Boston, Dr. Garland lived and
practiced medicine in the middle­
class black community that once
existed on Dartmouth and
Buckingham streets near the Back
Bay railroad station. In 1908, he
bought a small rowhouse at 12 East
Springfield Street in the South End
and opened Plymouth Hospital and
Nurses’ Training School. Why the
name Plymouth is unknown. At the
time, there were fewer than twenty
black hospitals, not counting
drugstores, in the entire country.
East Springfield Street is a
tree­lined block between
Washington Street and Harrison
Avenue where it meets Boston City
Hospital; Plymouth Hospital was
closer to Washington Street. In the
early 1900s, the majority of property
owners on East Springfield Street
W
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were Irish, with some Eastern
European Jews, and the South End
as a whole was a mix of Irish,
Canadian, Syrian, Lebanese, Greek,
German and Eastern European
Jewish immigrants
— a large lodging
house district with
many charities and
settlement houses.
Blacks, who had
moved from Beacon
Hill in the 1890s,
settled in the upper
South End and
Lower Roxbury.
While other small
hospitals that began
in the South End — Children’s
Hospital, New England Deaconess,
and the Free Hospital for Women —
may have benefitted from their
proximity to “City,” Plymouth
Hospital could not. Garland may
have chosen the location because
the El, an elevated train that started
running down Washington Street in
1901, made for easy access.
“The hospital was
established to meet the increasing
demand for hospital
accommodations, where colored
physicians might diagnose and treat
their own cases,” wrote W. N.
Hartshorn, a downtown publisher
who hosted a 1908 conference on
the progress of the “American
Negro” and put out a hefty book
full of biographical information.”
The hospital is chartered by the
state and is open to all who are in
need of medical or surgical care,
regardless of race, color, or
religion.” He noted that, although
home visits had been made to “a
number of white patients” in
Plymouth Hospital’s first year,
“nearly all the work was among the
colored people.” [1]
In a 1914 report, Dr.
Garland described Plymouth
Hospital and Nurses’ Training
School as “a private Institution
supported solely by the voluntary
contributions and receipts from
those patients who are able to pay
something.” From 1909
to 1914, 135 male and
457 female patients
were admitted. As he
was a surgeon, surgical
patients were the
majority, and there
were many appendec­
tomies, hysterectomies,
and tonsillectomies. 600
people, including
children, were seen in
the free outpatient
department, and 200 cared for by
nurses doing “Free District Work”
or home visits “into the homes of
the poor and needy.” [2]
“This free district work is
with those who are not in position
to pay for nurse care,” wrote
Hartshorn. “Frequently the nurse
carries bed linen and other material
where the need is imperative. The
medicines are furnished free to
these district patients, and there are
many evidences of grateful
appreciation.”
Twenty­two young women
between the ages of 19 and 35
registered at the Nurses’ Training
School the first year. “The school
was open to all who possess
grammar school education and
physical capacity to undergo the
strenuous life which necessarily
accompanies the profession of
nurse,” wrote Hartshorn.
The community supported
the hospital, with local residents,
churches, and settlement houses
donating blankets, bottles, rugs, tea
kettles, sauce pans, nightgowns,
books, magazines and, in those days
of flower missions, cut flowers.
Churches made referrals.
One of the keys to the
success of black doctors at the time
was involvement in professional
associations, such as the Bay State
Medical Association, founded by
black doctors, dentists and
pharmacists in 1930. Black doctors
were able to make inroads into the
Massachusetts Medical Association,
founded in 1781; Dr. Garland
became vice president. When the
National Medical Association,
which represented African­
American physicians and patients,
held its annual meeting in Boston in
1909, membership included 350
black physicians, surgeons, and
pharmacists.
From the inception of
Plymouth Hospital, Boston black
civil rights leader William Monroe
Trotter was opposed to a racially
segregated hospital and wrote
against it in The Guardian
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A young Dr. Garland.
1910­1911 class of the Nurses' Training School.
newspaper. When, almost twenty
years later, Dr. Garland planned to
expand Plymouth Hospital to
Roxbury, Trotter, his sister Maude
Steward, and prominent black
doctors William Worthy and Walter
O. Taylor objected; they were intent
on integrating Boston
City Hospital. [3]
Those must
have been stressful
times. Drs. Worthy
and Taylor had been
on the Plymouth Hospital’s medical
staff for years. Taylor, as a student,
had roomed with the Garland
family. Both were graduates of the
College of Physicians and Surgeons
on Shawmut Avenue, just around
the corner. Garland’s plan was
never realized.
Dr. Worthy’s daughter
Myrtle was quoted in Black Bostonia
[1976]: “A second­rate, segregated
hospital was not what my father or
Mr. Trotter wanted [...] a hospital
for the colored.” To author Lance
Carden, she added, “And it would
mean eventually that the colored
would be shut out of the City
Hospital and the clinics and sent
there.”
Roxbury civic leader
Melnea Cass expressed another
view when she was quoted in Black
Bostonia. “[Garland] wanted a place
where colored people could go and
freely train [...] We needed that
hospital. If we had put our forces
behind it, white and black would
have gone there [...] A monument to
black people’s ingenuity.” [4]
After an exchange of polite
letters with the superintendent of
City Hospital, in which Trotter’s
group stressed the legal rights of
two black women who had applied
to its Training School for Nurses —
which was, after all, a public
institution — the women were
admitted in 1929. In 1931 Dr. John
Hall II became the first black intern
to train there, but it was not until
1949 that the first black physician,
Dr. Charles Bonner, was appointed
to the staff.
Plymouth Hospital closed
in 1928. Dr. Garland
was hardly out of
business, however.
For years, he had
been in private
practice at 225 West
Canton Street in the South End,
which was also his home. In the
1930s, he, his wife Maggie, and
daughter Thelma moved to 173
Mason Terrace in Brookline, while
his office remained on West Canton
Street. They also had a comfortable
summer cottage in Oak Bluffs on
Martha’s Vineyard, where the
family was part of the Vineyard
social scene. Dr. Garland was the
first black man to join the East Chop
Beach Club, and his daughter
Thelma was one of the founders of
the Cottagers, a
group of black
women still active
in charitable
activities on the
island. The family
spent every
summer at Oak
Bluffs from 1921
to 1952, the year
Dr. Garland died,
selling the cottage
only within the
last two decades.
In 1949,
Ebony magazine
ran a photo of Dr. Garland and his
granddaughter Joan captioned, “Dr.
Garland, Boston’s richest physician,
is veteran at Oak Bluffs summer
colony.” It didn’t say richest black
physician, it said richest physician.
The caption also said, “Now at
Radcliffe College, Joan had brilliant
debut last year.” [5]
Joan, like her younger sister
Jocelyn and their mother Thelma,
went to Radcliffe College. When she
married a Harvard professor, “it
was the biggest social interracial
event at the time,” says a local
woman who knew her well and
visited Oak Bluffs and Mason
Terrace. She remembers the day Dr.
Garland bought a new Packard and
discovered it wouldn’t fit in the
garage. Joan and her husband
moved to Ohio, while Jocelyn
married a doctor and moved out
west.
Thelma thought of herself
as a “flapper,” according to her
grandson Dan. She hobnobbed with
various notables of black society,
including Yolanda DuBois,
daughter of W.E.B. DuBois —
Thelma was in her wedding party
— and Frank Horne, a Harlem
renaissance writer and uncle of
Lena Horne. Horne dedicated a
poem to Thelma, using her
nickname Tele, and it was
published in The Crisis magazine.
“That was my grandmother, a fun
person,” says Dan. [6]
A Black Heritage Site
plaque was put on the East52Aceso
In 1908, there werefewer than twentyblack hospitals in theentire country.
Taborian Ward, Plymouth Hospital, furnished by the TwelveKnights and Daughters of Tabor.
Springfield Street building during
America’s Bicentennial in 1976, but
is easy to miss for all the ivy. Now
apartments, the small, narrow
house is relatively unchanged from
Dr. Garland’s day. The front room
on the first floor still looks like Dr.
Garland’s office, minus the
Victorian light fixtures and Dr.
Garland’s portrait hanging between
the bow windows. The third floor is
also recognizable as the Taborian
ward, furnished by the Twelve
Knights and Daughters of Tabor,
one of the secret societies of which
Dr. Garland was a member.
Although the rooms on the fourth
floor have been reconfigured, the
operating room skylight remains.
Other small hospitals in the area
that started in rowhouses also had
their operating rooms on the top
floor for the light, and staff had to
carry patients up all the stairs —
undoubtedly part of “the strenuous
life which necessarily accompanies
the profession of
nurse.”
Plymouth
Hospital is not
ancient history
when you
consider that
people still living
were treated by
Dr. Garland.
Richard Brown of
Tremont Street,
for instance, now
in his late
eighties, saw Dr.
Garland when he
was a child. “I
grew up with a bunch of heroes,”
he says.
The above photos are from W. N.
Hartshorn, ed., An Era of Progress and
Promise, 1863­1910, The Religious, Moral,
and Educational Development of the
American Negro since His Emancipation.
1910.
Notes:
[1] Hartshorn WN, ed. The Clifton [MA]
Conference, An Era of Progress and
Promise, 1863­1910, The Religious, Moral,
and Educational Development of the
American Negro since His Emancipation.
Boston, MA: Priscilla Publishing Co;
1910.
[2] Garland CN. Report of the Plymouth
Hospital and Nurses’ Training School.
1914.
[3] The Guardian, which was Boston’s
black newspaper, was co­founded by
William Monroe Trotter in 1901. Trotter
was the editor.
[4] Boston 200 Corporation. (1976). Black
Bostonia.
[5] Ebony Magazine. July 1949: 42.
[6] The Crisis, an official magazine of the
National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People
(NAACP), was founded by W.E.B. Du
Bois in 1910. It was a major vehicle for
stories and poems by black writers
during the Harlem Renaissance.
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Dr. Garland's first floor office.
From the BUSM Archives
This is a 1939 photo of Boston
Medical Center's Dowling Building.
The building was completed in 1937
for $1.6 million. It had 288 beds and
14 operating rooms in its 9 stories.
Today, it houses mostly offices.
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Nineteenth Century and Today
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Medical Education
here have been severalepochal shifts in theAmerican residencytraining landscape inthe last 150 years, including theOslerian revolution at JohnsHopkins in the 1880s, the labordisputes of the 1960s, and, morerecently, the arrival of work hoursrestrictions and competencyaccreditation and the Milestoneswith the Next AccreditationSystem, delineated by theAccreditation Council for GraduateMedical Education. The rapid paceof current and predicted change inhealthcare delivery models (e.g.pay­for­performance, patient­centered medical homes,accountable care organizations,etc.) should bring about furtherlarge­scale shifts in how graduatemedical education (GME) is shapedin this country, with new emphasison ambulatory training and theteaching of value­added care. [1]As we approach this new
period with anticipated changes,there is value in reconsidering oneof the fundamental dualitiesunderpinning residency training ­the intrinsic tension betweenresidents as laborers and learners.On the one hand, residents areresponsible for helping hospitalsrun on a day­to­day basis, whetherit is so called “scut” work or thecognitively complex aspects ofpatient care. On the other hand,residency programs are responsiblefor training them to becomecompetent clinicians, teachers, andoften scholars, with both clinicalexperience and didactic curricula.This dichotomy informs everyaspect of a resident’s work life. Ineffect, there exists a social contractbetween programs and residents. Inexchange for defined incomes,helping the hospital function in anefficient manner, and teachingjunior clinicians – both juniorresidents and medical students ­hospitals train and give their
imprimatur to residents.Historian KennethLudmerer has looked extensively atthis dynamic in late nineteenth andearly­mid twentieth centurytraining programs. [2] From theOslerian transition to modernresidency programs in the late1800s onward, hospitals andaccreditation bodies have wrestledwith finding the optimal balancebetween residents’ laboring andlearning. Notably, this dichotomypredates even the earliest formalresidency programs, having roots asfar back as the post­apprentice erain the early nineteenth century. Atthe end of the eighteenth centurymedical apprenticeships were thenorm; individual pupils wouldlearn at the side of individualclinicians. [3] By the nineteenthcentury, with the rise to prominenceof several university­based medicalschools, post­graduate housephysician and house surgeonpositions proliferated. These
T
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trainees served similar roles asmodern residents, staffing wardsand caring for patients under thesupervision of staff physicians.With the arrival offormalized house physician andhouse surgeon positions in the earlynineteenth century, in cities such asNew York, Boston, andPhiladelphia, this laborer/learnerdichotomy became crystallized. Onemanifestation was the day­to­dayschedule residents were asked towork. Nineteenth century housephysicians worked essentiallycontinuous shifts, as a rule residingin the hospital, often with little orno pay ­ most hospitals had onlyone or two housestaff. Indeed, thedesignation of “resident” derivesfrom the fact that the physicians intraining lived on the sites ofteaching hospitals. Towards the endof the century, with the arrival ofelectric lights and better surgicaltechniques, truly twenty­four hourcare could be delivered. Somehousestaff were asked to maintainthe hospital’s “electric and galvanicapparatus always in perfect order,”[4] or to function as surgicaltechnicians or ex officio librarians inaddition to patient care duties. [5]Others “[saw] that the medicinessent to the sick [were] regularlytaken,” overseeing nursing practiceand patient adherence, [6] all whilecaring for as many as seventy­fivepatients at a time.The tension betweenresidents’ dual roles as laborers andlearners hasn’t been diluted withtime. Routine work that residentsdo every day to ensure adequateworkflow is a direct analogue tothat of the nineteenth century.While “learning by doing” is acentral GME tenet, many taskscurrent residents perform are of lessobvious educational benefit. Thistension reflects the inherent socialcontract that exists betweenhospitals/residency programs andhousestaff.At the same time, it isworth noting that the roles oflaborer and learner are notmutually exclusive. In order toattain sufficient experience and toachieve understanding andexpertise, rather than justknowledge or familiarity, learners
may require engagement in taskswhich might feel like laboring buthave clear learning value. Aresident can be “laboring” – forexample, reconciling a patient’smedications or treating congestiveheart failure for the 100th time–while at the same time learning:e.g., finding new and instructivenuances in every case or becomingexpert by means of repetition ordiscovering how to complete tasksefficiently. The story of theevolution of residency programsand GME regulation can largely beviewed as a commentary on thiscentral duality.Enhanced oversight andnew regulations have actually madethe dichotomy between residents aslaborers and learners moreprominent and transparent, beingfurther compounded by increasedclinical loads, decreased lengths ofstay (adding to the clinical burden)and increased requirements fordocumentation of teaching andlearning. Furthermore, facultyexperience an analogous splitbetween their duties as clinical careproviders and educators. Theirincreased clinical load, andincreased responsibilities forevidence­based educationaloutcomes is in many ways a mirrorimage of the often­conflictedduality facing residents. While paidfor their clinical labor (throughrelative value units), they haverarely been compensated forteaching and learning, which is alsoconsidered an honor in mostteaching hospitals.The evolving state ofAmerican health care, and thusGME, will surely put new stress onthis social contract. As laborers,residents (and residencies) willneed to adapt to the changingreality of accountable careorganizations. This will requireadditional staffing roles in theambulatory arena and potentiallynecessitate protected time forresidents to practice in theoutpatient setting. As learners,residents will need, and residencieswill be required to provide,additional training in provision ofvalue­added care, quality metricsand patient safety. To meet theseneeds, the faculty will require
additional training to provide sucheducation in a newly formed systemwith which they have limitedexperience.While residency in thetwenty­first century will in manyways not resemble what camebefore, the tension of resident aslaborer and learner will almostsurely remain. It is neither new, norsimply a product of the Oslerianresidency. It has far earlier roots inAmerican medicine andunderstanding those roots, andappreciating the impact of modernhealthcare on the resident as bothlearner and laborer, will ensure asmoother transition to the nextgeneration of residencyprograms.
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